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Abstract
This paper assesses the welfare impact of trade and technology diusion as well as the
change in the cross-country distribution of GDP due to removal of trade costs and diusion
barriers. The model extends the multi-country Ricardian trade model of Alvarez and Lucas
(2007) to include technology diusion with diusion barriers. A key feature of the model is
that some countries act as intermediaries and export goods produced by foreign technology via
diusion. The model is calibrated to match the world GDP distribution, the merchandise trade
and technology diusion shares of GDP, and real GDP per capita. Data on international trade
in royalties, license fees, and information intensive services are used as proxies for international
technology diusion. There are three key ndings. First, the welfare gains from removing dif-
fusion barriers are 4{60% across countries, generally larger than the gains from removing trade
costs (8{40%). The main reason is that diusion has a larger impact on the nontradable sector
due to the substitutability between trade and diusion in the tradable sector. Second, removing
trade costs and diusion barriers has little impact on reducing the dispersion of real GDP per
capita (measured by Gini index) across countries. Compared to the benchmark, free diusion
decreases the Gini by 4%, and free trade decreases the Gini by 2%. Third, removing diusion
barriers increases trade, which indicates that diusion may enhance trade.
JEL: F15, F17, O11, O33, O40
Keywords: trade, technology di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usion barriers, trade costs, welfare gains, GDP dis-
tribution, knowledge trade
Li: Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon,
Hong Kong (e-mail: yaoli@ust.hk; website: http://ihome.ust.hk/yaoli). My thanks to Robert E. Lucas, Samuel S.
Kortum, Stephen Redding, Andres Rodrguez-Clare, Wolfgang Keller, Stephen Yeaple, Edwin Lai, Jonathan Eaton,
Arnaud Costinot, Raymond Riezman, Thomas Holmes, Taiji Furusawa, Jota Ishikawa, Natalia Ramondo, Davin
Chor, the participants of the EIIT conference (University of Chicago, 2010), the EITI conference (Keio University,
Tokyo, 2011), the Asian Meeting of Econometrics Society Conference (Korea University, Seoul, 2011), the IEFS China
conference (UIBE, Beijing, 2011), the Midwest International Economics Conference (Penn State University, 2009), the
Canadian Economics Association Annual Meetings (Toronto, 2009; Quebec City, 2010), Rocky Mountain Empirical
Trade Conference (Ban, Canada, 2010), The Asia-Pacic Innovation Conference (2011), the Hitotsubashi COE Trade
Workshop (2010), and seminar participants at UWO, Syracuse University, HKUST, University of Winnipeg, CUHK,
City University of Hong Kong, Lingnan University, and National University of Singapore for helpful comments and
suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was circulated with the title \Trade in Goods, Trade in Knowledge, and
the Role of Trade Costs: A General Equilibrium Analysis". In addition, I am indebted to John Whalley, Jim MacGee
and Hiroyuki Kasahara for guidance and inspiration. All errors are mine.
1 Introduction
International technology diusion has become increasingly important over the past twenty years.
While precise measures of international technology diusion are lacking, the available data reveal
rapid growth. For example, the value of international trade in royalties and license fees has in-
creased by a factor of eleven over the last two decades.1 In some developed countries, trade in
royalties and license fees is now the second most important category among the aggregate service
categories (Breinlich and Criscuolo, 2011).2 Combined with trade in information intensive services,
the world total value of payments associated with international technology diusion now equals
14% of world merchandise trade.3 Moreover, the magnitude of technology diusion as percent-
age of gross domestic product (GDP) is signicant: payments associated with inward technology
diusion are as large as 16.3% of GDP in Ireland and average 4% of GDP across developed and
emerging market economies.4
Technology diusion not only changes the productivity of goods produced for domestic markets,
but also impacts international merchandise trade. An example of this is a DVD player, which is
typically licensed to a Chinese manufacturer and then exported abroad. In 2002, Chinese rms
typically paid $15-$20 per player in license fees and they in turn manufactured 70% of the world
DVD players.5 Not surprisingly, China was the top exporting country of DVD players in the
world. This example illustrates the substantial inuence of technology diusion as China became
the biggest exporter of Information, Communication, Technology (ICT) goods in 2004.6 Without
technology diusion, it is dicult to imagine this enormous change in global trade patterns.
Motivated by its increasing importance, and, in particular, its importance to world trade, I
investigate international technology diusion and international trade in this paper using a trade
model that incorporates technology diusion, trade barriers and diusion barriers. The purpose
of this paper is to assess and compare the welfare impacts of international trade and technology
diusion as well as to quantify the change in the cross-country distribution of GDP resulting
from the reduction of trade costs and the reduction of barriers to technology diusion. This is
accomplished through answering two questions: First, how large are diusion barriers and trade
costs across countries? Second, given the current level of trade costs and diusion barriers, how
1Data source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2008). Trade in royalties and license fees refers to international
payments of royalties and licensing fees. It covers the exchange of payments (imports) and receipts (exports) between
residents and nonresidents for the authorized use of intangible, nonproduced, nonnancial assets and proprietary
rights and with the use, through licensing agreements, of produced originals or prototypes. To follow the terminology
in the UNCTAD Handbook and the IMF's Balance of Payments Manual, I use \license fees" instead of \licensing
fees", even though the latter is more precise.
2The United Kingdom (UK), the world's second largest services exporter, reported that the value of international
payments of royalties and license fees is approximately 23% (exports) and 26% (imports) of total trade in services
between 2000 and 2005 in the UK (Breinlich and Criscuolo, 2011).
3Data source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2008).
4The payments associated with inward technology diusion in this paper refer to those through imports of royalties,
license fees, and information intensive services. The sample contains 31 countries. See Data Description and Figure
2 in Section 4 for more details.
5Producers of DVD players need to pay license fees to the patent holders of the DVD technology (Sony, Philips,
Toshiba and Time Warner) as well as for MPEG-2 licences.
6Data source: OECD, ITS database.
1
important is their elimination in terms of the change in welfare and the cross-country distribution
of GDP?
To answer these questions, this paper develops and calibrates a general equilibrium model in
which countries interact through trade in goods and diusion of technology. The model extends the
multi-country Ricardian trade model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2007)
to include diusion of knowledge.7 In the classic Ricardian trade literature, technology is implicitly
assumed to be exclusive to each country; thus, there is no room for technology diusion. To model
technology diusion, I dierentiate between two types of technologies in each country: exclusive
technologies, which are available only to the home country, and diusive technologies, which are
also available in countries other than the home country due to technology diusion.
Moreover, diusion of technology is impeded by barriers to diusion, such as dierent languages
in the source country of technology and the recipient country. Hence, barriers to technology diu-
sion are introduced to examine the volume of diusion. Similar to merchandise trade, technology
diusion in the model is limited by \iceberg" diusion barriers. This assumption is consistent with
the empirical evidence on the existence of signicant barriers to international knowledge diusion.
For example, Peri (2005) nds that national borders prevent 91% of average knowledge ows (i.e.,
only 9% is learned outside the country of origin), and Li (2009) investigates the changing pattern
of border and distance eects in knowledge ows.
In the model, there are multiple countries, and each country produces in two sectors: a trad-
able sector, which produces intermediate goods, and a nontradable sector, which produces nal
consumption goods. The key departure from Alvarez and Lucas (2007) is that diusion of technol-
ogy is introduced to the model, while in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) technology is implicitly assumed
to be exclusive. Diusion enlarges the set of available technology for each country and potentially
increases productivity. With diusion, productivity is determined by the domestic technology in
the production country plus the diusive technology from abroad. Between each country pair,
there exist trade costs and diusion barriers. Representative agents in each country look for poten-
tial trading partners (via importing goods) or diusion partners (via inward technology diusion)
around the world to nd the least costly method of obtaining tradable goods and nontradable
goods. An equilibrium outcome is that some countries (intermediaries) export goods produced
by foreign technology via diusion. For example, an intermediary country i might use diusive
technology from country j in production to achieve higher productivity and then export to country
n. This process involves diusion barriers from country j to i and trade costs from country i to n.
Allowing for countries to interact through both merchandise trade and technology diusion enriches
the international merchandise trade pattern in the model and enables the model to generate both
merchandise trade and technology diusion volume consistent with the data.8
7\Diusion of knowledge" and \technology diusion" are interchangeably used in this paper. Knowledge is any
intellectual input which serves to produce goods. A blueprint, an industrial design, a process redesign, and technical
support are all examples of knowledge. Eaton and Kortum (2005) use the word \ideas" as \the fundamental atom of
technology". In this paper, I use \knowledge" or \technology".
8In a model without technology diusion, the correlation coecient between the model generated merchandise
trade and the data is 0.59, as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007). My model generates the correlation as high as 0.92 for
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To quantitatively assess the current level of diusion barriers and trade costs as well as their
welfare impact, I calibrate the model to match the merchandise trade share, the technology diusion
share, the size of GDP, and the real GDP per capita for a sample of 31 countries.9 Data on
international trade in royalties, license fees, and information intensive services are used as proxies
for international technology diusion.10 The calibrated model has explanatory power of at least
95% for all variables of interest.11
Based on the calibrated model, I conduct counterfactual exercises and nd that free technology
diusion has greater welfare impact and contributes more to reducing the dispersion of real GDP
per capita than does free merchandise trade. Moreover, the results suggest that currently the world
has achieved more of the potential gains from reductions in trade barriers than the potential gains
from reductions in the barriers to technology diusion. These results can be summarized into three
key ndings.
First, the welfare impact of technology diusion is generally larger than that of merchandise
trade. Removing diusion barriers in the benchmark increases welfare by 4{60% across countries,
while removing merchandise trade costs increases welfare by 8{40%. The main reason is that
technology diusion has a larger impact on the nontradable sector due to the substitutability be-
tween merchandise trade and technology diusion in the tradable sector. That is, obtaining foreign
technology to produce goods locally decreases the incentive to import goods. Because technology
diusion substitutes for merchandise trade, diusion of technology benets a nontradable sector
more than it does a tradable sector. Another reason is that the technology diusion barriers are
higher than merchandise trade barriers for most countries. To assess the current benets of diu-
sion, I compare the dierence in welfare between the benchmark model and a hypothetical autarkic
world. I nd that shutting down trade leads to larger welfare losses than does shutting down dif-
fusion. This implies that the welfare improvement of moving from prohibitive trade costs to the
benchmark is larger than that of moving from prohibitive diusion barriers to the benchmark. This
in turn suggests that, currently, the world has exploited more of the potential gains from reduc-
tions in the barriers to merchandise trade than the potential gains from reductions in the barriers to
technology diusion. This calls for more attention to be paid to the reduction of diusion barriers.
Second, I nd that moving from the benchmark to free merchandise trade and free technology
diusion increase real GDP per capita by 5{30% and 4{55%, respectively. In both cases, the
dispersion of real GDP per capita across countries is reduced. The Gini index of real GDP per
capita is decreased by 4% due to moving from the benchmark to free technology diusion and by
2% due to moving from the benchmark to free merchandise trade. This is consistent with the result
merchandise trade share (as a percentage of a country's GDP).
9The sample includes most OECD countries and main emerging economies. The selection criteria is explained in
Section 4.1.
10See Section 4.1 for the reason why trade in information intensive services is included in the measure of technology
diusion. However, to verify the robustness of the results, I also use an alternative method with royalty-only measure
and nd that the main results remain unchanged.
11A measure of the explanatory power of the model is given by R2H = 1  
PI
i=1( eHdatai   eHmodeli )2PI
i=1( eHdatai )2 , where i indexes
country, and H represents each variable of interest (see Section 4.2 and Table 3 in Section 4.3 for more details).
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that free technology diusion generates larger gains than does free merchandise trade.
Third, removing diusion barriers increases merchandise trade because countries achieve higher
productivity from obtaining foreign technology via diusion and therefore improve their ability to
export to the global market. This nding implies that diusion may enhance trade, which contrasts
with the literature, because most existing trade models predict that diusion is a substitute for
trade: if one can use the technology of one's trading partners, then there is less need for trade
(Chaney, 2008). However, in this paper, due to the existence of intermediary countries who benet
from lower diusion barriers and greater diusion volumes, removal of diusion barriers eventually
increases trade. This is consistent with the rst two ndings because removing diusion barriers
has \spillover" eects on merchandise trade. Because of the indirect eect of reducing diusion
barriers, moving to free technology diusion has greater welfare impact and contributes more to
reducing the dispersion of real GDP per capita than does moving to free merchandise trade.
These ndings contribute to the emerging literature on trade and technology diusion (e.g.,
Eaton and Kortum, 2006; Rodrguez-Clare, 2007; Chaney, 2008).12 In this literature, authors
typically model technology diusion as owing from a global pool without diusion barriers or
costs of diusion. However, as Keller (2004) notes, there is no global pool of technology, since
knowledge can only be partially codied in diusion. Thus, in this paper, I introduce barriers
to technology diusion and quantitatively assess their importance. Besides, the literature does
not use data associated with technology diusion to compute the gains from diusion and trade.
Admittedly, technology diusion involves both market transactions and externalities and is dicult
to measure in the data (Keller, 2004). Therefore, quantifying the gains from diusion presents a
signicant challenge (Ramondo and Rodrguez-Clare, 2010). In calibrating the model, I use market
transaction data (captured by international payments of royalties and license fees as well as trade
in information intensive services) to measure technology diusion, which yields a lower bound of
the actual amount of technology diusion. The resulting gains from technology diusion must
also be the lower bound. Nonetheless, my results can be compared with estimated gains from
global diusion without diusion barriers in the literature. This literature usually pursues an
indirect approach based on an application of the semi-endogenous growth model to quantify the
importance of diusion. For example, Rodrguez-Clare (2007) based his work on the growth rate of
a country and calculated the upper bound of the overall gains from both trade and diusion to be
between 206% and 240% for a country with approximately 1% of the world's GDP. My results for
overall gains from trade and diusion for a similar country are around 69{73%. It is not surprising
that the gains from diusion in this paper are smaller than those found by Rodrguez-Clare (2007)
because I model diusion dierently and use market transaction data to directly quantify the gains
from diusion. Therefore, my method helps to understand and dissect the gains from technology
diusion through dierent channels.
The model structure is closely related to recent work that extends the Eaton-Kortum's (2002)
model to include FDI and quanties the importance of multinational production (MP), for example,
12Grossman and Helpman (1991) is an early exception.
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Ramondo and Rodrguez-Clare (2009, 2010, forthcoming), Irarrazabal et al. (2009), and Arkolakis
et al. (2012). Ramondo and Rodrguez-Clare (2009) incorporate MP into the model of trade by
allowing a country's technologies to be used for production abroad through multinational aliates
and explore the relation between MP and trade. Irarrazabal et al. (2009) introduce intra-rm
trade into Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) to explore the correlation between trade and MP
ows. Intra-rm trade is important in MP since multinational aliates often import goods from
their home parents. In this paper, however, I examine technology diusion via trade in royalties
and license fees. While part of trade in royalties and license fees is attributed to intra-rm
transactions, a non-negligible part of it is not: In 2010, the receipts from unaliated foreign
companies account for 37% of U.S. total receipts of royalties and license fees.13 Therefore, the
present framework captures the diusion of foreign technologies to non-aliated indigenous rms,
which MP does not capture. For example, if U.S. technologies are used for production in Canada by
non-aliated Canadian rms, this way of sharing technologies across countries cannot be captured
by MP but is partly captured by trade in royalties and license fees.14 In fact, trade in royalties
and license fees covers the exchange of payments and receipts associated with technology transfer
between residents and nonresidents, whether or not it belongs to intra-rm trade. Hence, given the
increasing importance of international payments associated with royalties and license fees as well
as trade in information intensive services, my approach provides a dierent proxy for technology
diusion, and complements the previous studies using MP. As Ramondo and Rodrguez-Clare
(2010) point out, much more attention should be devoted to understanding the sources of the gains
of diusion and the barriers to diusion. This paper thus provides a new approach on quantifying
the gains from diusion and, in addition, calibrates the barriers to diusion, by investigating trade
in royalties and license fees and its impact on merchandise trade.
This paper is also related to the empirical literature examining the role of borders, physical
distance, languages, technological dierences, and other factors determining knowledge ows (e.g.,
Peri, 2005; Li, 2009). These empirical studies use patent citation data as a proxy for knowledge
ows and mainly capture the barriers to externalities in technology diusion through knowledge
spillovers. This paper uses a general equilibrium model to quantitatively assess the barriers to
technology diusion based on detailed data on market transactions of technology (e.g., royalties
and license fees). This allows us to use a fully-specied model to make predictions on all variables
of interest and to investigate the interactions between merchandise trade and technology diusion.
Finally, this paper provides new insights into the recent literature exploring the potential gains
from liberalizing merchandise trade in Ricardian models (Alvarez and Lucas, 2007; Waugh, 2010).
I nd that the welfare gains of moving from total isolation to the frictionless world (with both free
trade and free diusion) are more than double the gains of moving from total isolation to free trade
alone. On the other hand, I obtain very similar magnitude of gains of moving from total isolation
13Data source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International Services: Cross-Border Trade in 2011 and
Services Supplied Through Aliates in 2010, Table F, \Royalties and License Fees Receipts and Payments," http :
==www:bea:gov=international=international services:htm, accessed 25 December 2012.
14Here, the word \partly" emphasizes that only the part associated with market transactions can be captured by
the data.
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to free trade alone to that obtained by Alvarez and Lucas (2007). For example, they calculated the
upper bounds of gains of moving from autarky to free trade in terms of consumption equivalence
for the U.S., Japan, and Denmark to be 10%, 14%, and 38% respectively. My results for the gains
of moving from autarky to free merchandise trade for these three countries are 10%, 15%, and 36%
respectively. When both diusion and trade are allowed for, the overall gains from moving from
total isolation to free trade and free diusion are larger: 15% for the U.S., 25% for Japan, and 77%
for Denmark. Here small countries benet more than large countries from both merchandise trade
and technology diusion because of the market size eect: large countries (in terms of GDP size)
already enjoy big domestic markets, which limits the potential gains from free trade and diusion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of trade and
technology diusion with one tradable sector to illustrate the mechanism and intuition. Section
3 develops the full model with both tradable and nontradable sectors and analyzes the general
equilibrium. Section 4 describes the data and calibration procedure as well as the benchmark
results. Section 5 presents the quantitative results from counterfactual exercises and also veries
the robustness of the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Model of Trade and Technology Diusion
This section presents a model with tradable goods to illustrate the mechanism and intuition. The
full model with both tradable and nontradable goods is presented in Section 3.
2.1 Environment
There are I countries indexed by i 2 f1; :::; Ig. Country i is endowed with Li units of labor (the only
factor of production). Each country produces a continuum of tradable goods indexed by u 2 [0; 1].
A representative agent chooses to consume q(u) units of good u to maximize a CES utility
U =
Z 1
0
q(u)
 1
 du
 
 1
(2.1)
with elasticity of substitution  > 0.
Let ci denote the unit cost of input in country i. Since labor is the only factor of production, ci
is equal to the wage rate wi.
15 As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), country i's eciency in producing
good u is denoted by zi(u), which is determined by country i's technology. With constant returns
to scale, the unit cost of producing good u in country i is ci=zi(u). Following Alvarez and Lucas
(2007), I work with the inverse of productivity, the cost parameter xi(u), where xi(u)
  = zi(u),
and  > 0 is a common parameter across goods and countries that amplies the eect of variability
of cost parameter. xi(u) is the cost parameter associated with country i's technology to produce
15I use the notation ci here to facilitate the comparison with the full model in Section 3.
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good u. The unit cost of producing good u in country i is xi(u)
ci.
16
The model without technology diusion follows Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and
Lucas (2007). The cost parameters xi for each good u are random variables, which are drawn from
a distribution that depends upon the total stock of knowledge in country i. This corresponds to the
economy's productivity for a good u which is determined by the best knowledge available for the
production of this good.17 It is easy to show that xi is distributed exponentially with parameter i,
xi  exp(i), where i is the stock of knowledge located in country i and i is also called technology
state parameter.18 As in Alvarez and Lucas (2007), country i's productivity only depends on its
own knowledge stock i; that is, technology is exclusive to its home country.
To incorporate technology diusion, I dierentiate between two types of technologies: exclusive
technologies, which are available only to its home country, and diusive technologies, which are
available to all countries due to technology diusion. Let xEi and x
D
i denote the cost parameters as-
sociated with exclusive and diusive technologies, which are independently drawn from exponential
distribution with parameters Ei and 
D
i , respectively. This is equivalent to dividing each coun-
try's domestic stock of knowledge i into two components: exclusive knowledge 
E
i and diusive
knowledge Di , where i = 
E
i + 
D
i . In other words, exclusive knowledge is limited to domestic
production in its home country, while diusive knowledge is migrating across national borders.
Without technology diusion, each country's productivity is only determined by its domestic
knowledge stock. Hence, the lowest cost of production in country i is xi ci, where xi = minfxEi ; xDi g
and xi  exp(i) by the property of exponential distribution.19 With technology diusion, the
scale of the set of available knowledge for each country is enlarged. Country i can therefore obtain
the lowest costs of production from both its own technology, which is associated with its own
knowledge stock i, and the diusive technology from other countries 
D
j (j 6= i) because only
diusive technology can be used in foreign countries. This means that country i can obtain the
cost parameter xDj associated with parameter 
D
j (j 6= i) via technology diusion.
Barriers to technology diusion play a key role in determining trade volumes. Consider a trad-
able good u produced in country m. This good can be produced with the productivity determined
by country m's own technology at unit cost xm(u)
cm. Good u can also be produced in country m
with the productivity determined by foreign technology from country i (m 6= i) through technol-
ogy diusion. But this process involves some barriers, denoted by bmi. Diusion barriers bmi are
16The two approaches in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) are equivalent except for the
denition of . The  in this paper, as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007), is the inverse of Eaton and Kortum's . Hence,
in this paper the higher , the larger dispersion of the productivity distribution.
17As in Eaton and Kortum (2005), the fundamental atom of technology is an idea (\a piece of knowledge") which
is just a recipe to produce good u with some eciency z. Knowledge for producing a particular good dier only in
terms of a \quality" parameter.
18This result comes from having  stock of knowledge for each good (each associated with a cost parameter), all of
which are independently drawn from an exponential distribution with parameter 1. Then, the distribution of the best
knowledge is exponential with parameter . The mathematical derivation is as below. Let q represent the quality of
knowledge, then Pr(Q  q) = H(q) = 1 1=q. Let v be the quality of the best knowledge that has arrived up to time
t, then using ex P1k=0 xk=k! we get Pr(V  v) =P1k=0(e ()k=k!)H(v)k = e =v, and hence, x  1=v  exp().
See Kortum (1997) and Rodrguez-Clare (2007).
19The property is that if x and y are independent, x  exp() and y  exp(), then minfx; yg  exp(+ ).
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country-pair specic costs associated with using diusive technology from technology home country
i to produce in country m. Similar to trade costs for goods, diusion barriers are also modeled
as \iceberg" costs: bmi < 1 (if m 6= i), bmi = 1 (if m = i), and bmi  bmjbji. Diusion barriers
only exist when diusive technology is used by a country outside its home country. If the diusive
technology is used in its home country, no diusion costs are incurred by assumption (i.e., bii = 1).
Diusion barriers can also be viewed as a discount factor b 2 [0; 1], where b closer to 1 means lower
barriers to diusion and b closer to 0 means higher barriers. Taking into account technology diu-
sion with diusion barriers, good u can also be produced in country m at unit cost (xDi (u)
cm)=bmi.
It uses the domestic input cm in country m, but the cost parameter is associated with country i's
diusive technology, which has to be discounted by diusion barriers between country i and m. I
dene cmi  cm=bmi for convenience. Hence the lowest cost to produce good u in country m is
simply
min

[xm(u)]
cm;min
i 6=m
[xDi (u)]
cmi

= min
8<:xEm(u) cm; mini2f1;;Ig
"
xDi (u)
b
1=
mi
#
cm
9=; (2.2)
where the RHS follows from xm(u) = minfxEm(u); xDm(u)g.
2.2 Equilibrium
Following Alvarez and Lucas (2007), I relabel goods by the vector x  (xE ; xD) rather than u
where xE  (xE1 ; xE2 ; :::; xEI ) and xD  (xD1 ; xD2 ; :::; xDI ). Under perfect competition,20 the unit cost
of a tradable good (xE ; xD) produced in country m (intermediary country) with technology from
country i and then shipped to country n is (xDi )
cmi=knm, where knm is \iceberg" trade cost for
goods, with one unit of a good shipped from m resulting in knm  1 units arriving in n (where
knn = 1, and kni  knmkmi for all n;m; i). The price of the good (xE ; xD) in country n is simply
the minimum cost at which it can be obtained by n, namely
pn(x
E ; xD) = min
8<:mini
"
xEi
k
1=
ni
#
ci;min
i;m
"
xDi
b
1=
mi k
1=
nm
#
cm
9=; (2.3)
The rst term on the right-hand side (RHS) minimizes over all possible ways in which country n
can procure the good conditional on using exclusive technology. Note that country n can benet
20As the main task of this paper is to quantify the gains from diusion, the model developed here tries to capture
the general features of trade and diusion, where diusion may take the form of externality or market transactions
(Keller, 2004). In the latter calibration part, I use data of international royalty payments and license fees combined
with trade in information intensive services, merely as a proxy for the lower bound of the volume of technology
diusion. Therefore, to better understand the general impact of diusion on trade, I build a Ricardian model with
perfect competition rather than a model with imperfect competition. In the literature, the imperfect competition
model well captures endogenous innovation process but often at the expense of not having a nontraded intermediate
good sector. For example, Eaton and Kortum (1999) did not examine the impact of technology diusion on trade,
whereas the current model, calibrated to the cross-country data of both trade and diusion, does. On the other hand,
I try to compare my results with Alvarez and Lucas (2007), and therefore, my model structure also comes close to
theirs.
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from the exclusive technology of other countries through importing the good produced by exclusive
technology of other countries (i.e., i 6= n). The second term on the RHS minimizes over all possible
ways in which country n can procure the good conditional on using diusive technology from
technology home country i to produce in an intermediary country m for all fi;mg combinations.
Note that country n can also benet from the diusive technology of other countries through either
using diusive technology from other countries to produce the good domestically (i.e., i 6= m = n) or
importing the good produced by diusive technology of other countries in an intermediary country
(i.e., m 6= n for all possible fi;mg). The rst term is a standard term as in Eaton and Kortum
(2002) and in Alvarez and Lucas (2007). The second term now emerges due to technology diusion.
Since xEi and x
D
i are independently drawn from exponential distribution with parameters 
E
i and
Di , it follows from the properties of the exponential distribution that pn(x
E ; xD)1= is distributed
exponentially with parameter 21
n 
X
i
(Eni + 
D
ni); (2.4)
where Eni = (ci=kni)
 1=Ei and 
D
ni = (~cni)
 1=Di , and ~cni  minmfcmi=knmg is the minimum
cost of the input for goods produced in country m using diusive technology from i (taking into
account all possible intermediary country m). Intuitively, the price parameter n summaries the
eective technology that country n can tap into from all over the world, after taking into account
the knowledge stocks and input costs around the world as well as trade costs, and diusion barriers
between n and other countries.
Given the distribution of prices across goods and CES preferences, pn, the price index in country
n, satises
p1 n =
Z
pn(x
E ; xD)1 dF (xE ; xD)
where F (xE ; xD) is the joint distribution of xE and xD. Therefore, we have
pn = C
 
n ; (2.5)
where C =  (1 + (1  ))1=(1 ) is a constant, with  () being the Gamma function.22
As shown by Eaton and Kortum (2002), the average price charged by any country i in country
n is the same. Moreover, by the properties of the exponential distribution, a share Eni  Eni=n
of goods bought by country n will be produced by country i with its exclusive technology. Letting
Xn = wnLn denote total spending by country n, then
EniXn (2.6)
is the value of goods produced with exclusive technology in country i that are exported to country
n. Similarly, DniXn =
Dni
n
Xn is the value of goods consumed by n that are produced with diusive
21These properties are: (1) if x  exp() and k > 0 then kx  exp(=k); and (2) if x and y are independent,
x  exp() and y  exp(), then minfx; yg  exp(+ ).
22Rodrguez-Clare (2007) explains why 1 + (1  ) > 0 holds.
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technology from i. Note that those goods could be produced in any intermediary country m 2
argminj(~cji=knj). Let y
D
nmi be the share of the spending on goods produced in country m (then
shipped to n) in total spending by country n on goods produced with diusive technology from
country i. We have
P
m y
D
nmi = 1 since these are shares over all possible intermediary countries for
the pair fn; ig. In equilibrium, the following "complementary slackness" conditions must hold:
cmi=knm > ~cni ) yDnmi = 0
and yDnmi > 0) cmi=knm = ~cni
The value of goods produced in m for n using diusive technology from i is DnmiXn, where 
D
nmi 
yDnmi
D
ni=n. Summing over i yields the total imports by n from m of goods produced with diusive
technology, X
i
DnmiXn (2.7)
Using (2.6) and (2.7), total value of imports of goods by n from i is given by0@Eni +X
j
Dnij
1AXn = (Eni + Dnii)Xn +
0@X
j 6=i
Dnij
1AXn (2.8)
Thus, total value of imports of goods by n from i 6= n is given by
Mni =
0@Eni +X
j
Dnij
1AwnLn (2.9)
Aggregate value of imports for country n is simply Mn =
P
i6=nMni. Trade balance condition is
given by X
i 6=n
Mni =
X
i6=n
Min (2.10)
The expression for total value associated with technology diusion from country i to production
country m is denoted by MDmi. This is associated with the value of goods produced by diusive
technology from country i to m and those goods are then shipped to all over the world. Summing
up over all destination countries n yields
MDmi =
X
n
DnmiXn (2.11)
Denition. A competitive equilibrium is characterized by vectors of prices pn = (p1; p2; :::; pI)
and wages w = (w1; w2; :::; wI) such that, together with the vector (1; 2; :::; I), equations (2.4),
(2.5), and the trade balance condition (2.10) are satised. Moreover, a share Eni of goods bought
by country n is produced by country i's exclusive technology, and a share Dni of goods bought by
country n is produced by country i's diusive technology. Finally, the technology diusion condition
10
is expressed by (2.11).23
2.3 Some results under symmetry
To gain intuition on the model mechanisms, consider the case of symmetric countries (Li = L), trade
costs, and diusion barriers (kni = k and bni = b for all n 6= i), which can be solved analytically.
Symmetry yields wn = w,cn = c, w = c, and pn = p. The unit cost of input using diusive
technology is cmi = c=b for all m 6= i. If the condition k < b(< 1) is satised (i.e., diusion barriers
are smaller than trade costs since b is closer to 1 than k), then yDnmi = 0 for all n 6= m: there
is no trade in goods produced with diusive technology since barriers to technology diusion are
smaller than trade costs for goods, and so country n would prefer domestic production using foreign
technology through diusion rather than importing goods from intermediary countries. Hence, if
k < b, there are no intermediary countries in this symmetric world.24 From (2.5), the price level in
any country is
p = C[+ (I   1)(k1=E + b1=D)] w (2.12)
Intuitively, the term inside the squared brackets captures the eective knowledge, which can be en-
joyed by consumers in any country: domestic stock of knowledge  = E+D, exclusive knowledge
from other countries taking into account trade costs for goods, k1=, and diusive knowledge from
other countries taking into account diusion barriers, b1=. Consumers enjoy exclusive knowledge
through importing tradable goods, and diusive knowledge through technology diusion to produce
goods domestically.
Trade Flows The share that country n will devote to spending on goods produced in country
i 6= n with country i's exclusive technology is simply the contribution of country i's exclusive
knowledge to the eective knowledge in country n. Thus, under symmetry it is
E =
k1=E
+ (I   1)(k1=E + b1=D) (2.13)
Similarly, the share that n will spend on goods produced locally with diusive technology via
diusion from country i is the contribution of i's diusive knowledge to the eective knowledge in
country n,
D =
b1=D
+ (I   1)(k1=E + b1=D) (2.14)
Now consider the eect of a change in the diusion barrier parameter b on trade ows. When
b decreases (i.e., barriers to technology diusion become larger), E increases, which implies that
merchandise import share of country n from country i increases with bilateral diusion barriers. In
23We use the normalization:
PI
i=1 wiLi = 1.
24If diusion barriers are larger than trade costs (i.e., b < k), there is no diusion in this symmetric world, since
wages are equalized. But in an asymmetric world, even if b < k, technology diusion exists because countries try to
benet from lower wages in production countries.
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this case, if there is no exclusive knowledge (i.e., all knowledge is diusive, D = ), then E = 0.
This is consistent with the prediction about the substitutability between merchandise trade and
technology diusion in traditional Ricardian models; that is, technology diusion substitutes for
merchandise imports in the tradable sector.
Welfare Gains For simplicity, assume k < b (i.e., merchandise trade costs larger than diusion
barriers) in the benchmark. The gains from moving from isolation (no merchandise trade and no
technology diusion)25 to openness based on the benchmark (the benchmark with trade in goods
and technology diusion), call it GO, can be computed by comparing the changes in real wage, w=p.
Under symmetry, wages are equalized across countries, hence they can be normalized to one. Then
one only needs to compare prices across dierent scenarios to compare the welfare gains. The price
index for the benchmark is given by (2.12), whereas the analogous result with isolation is obtained
by letting k ! 0 and b ! 0 in (2.12). This yields the price level under isolation pISO = C w.
Hence, the proportional gains from openness (fGO) are given by
fGO = pISO
p
=
"
+ (I   1)(k1=E + b1=D)

#
(2.15)
or, GO = ln(fGO). (Expressions for gains with a tilde represent proportional gains.) It is easy to
see that the gains from openness GO increases with k and b: the lower trade costs or the lower
diusion barriers, the larger the welfare gains from openness.
To compare the gains from trade and the gains from diusion, I calculate gains from trade
by computing the gains of moving from isolation to only trade (no diusion), GT . Analogously, I
calculate gains from diusion by computing the gains of moving from isolation to only diusion (no
trade), GD. Then I derive the price index when there is only trade. From (2.12), by letting b! 0,
and allowing diusive technology to be used for domestic production and trade, the price for only
trade is
pT = C
h
(1 + (I   1)k1=)
i 
w
Gains from trade are then given by
fGT = pISO
pT
=
h
1 + (I   1)k1=
i
(2.16)
Not surprisingly, gains from trade (GT ) increase with the value of k, i.e., the smaller trade costs,
the larger gains from trade. Similarly, the gains from diusion (increase in real wage from isolation
to only diusion and no trade) are
gGD = pISO
pD
=
"
+ (I   1)b1=D

#
(2.17)
The gains from technology diusion (GD) increase with b and the proportion of diusive knowledge
25The isolation is the hypothetical scenario with prohibitively high trade costs and diusion barriers such that
neither trade nor diusion could occur.
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in total knowledge stock (D=). This means that the smaller diusion barriers and the larger share
of diusive knowledge, the larger gains from diusion. Here gains from merchandise trade (GT ) do
not depend on exclusive knowledge (E), because it is implicitly assumed that without diusion, all
goods produced by domestic knowledge can be traded, while only diusive knowledge is amenable
to production in foreign countries through diusion when countries are open to technology diusion.
Then the total gains from current openness are less than the sum of gains from both trade and
diusion (GO < GT +GD), i.e., trade and diusion behave like substitutes in this symmetric world,
but the substitution eect is dampened by the diusion barriers.26
It is worth noting that gains from diusion are not always greater than those from trade. If
b1=(D=) > k1=, gains from diusion are larger than those from trade. But if the share of
diusive knowledge (D=) is small, it could be that gains from trade are larger (GD < GT ). There
is a threshold level of diusive knowledge D in this symmetric case such that the gains from
diusion equal gains from trade. Even if all knowledge is diusive (i.e., D= = 1, each country
has no exclusive knowledge), trade still exists due to the existence of diusion barriers. Hence, the
comparison of welfare gains from trade and diusion depends on the trade-o between trade costs
and diusion barriers as well as the share of diusive knowledge in overall knowledge stock.
3 Full Model: Tradable and Nontradable Sectors
This section extends the model by introducing nontradable goods, which are also amenable to
technology diusion, and an input-output loop where intermediate goods are used for the production
of other intermediate goods as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007). I rst present a single, closed economy
before turning to the open economy case.
3.1 Closed Economy Equilibrium
Labor is the only primary (non-produced) factor of production, and production requires labor and
intermediate goods as inputs. There are two sectors in the economy, a tradable sector (intermediate
goods) and a nontradable sector (nal goods). Formally, I assume that nontradable goods are
continuum goods indexed by v 2 [0; 1] and tradable goods are indexed by u 2 [0; 1]. A representative
agent consumes a continuum of nal consumption goods in quantities qf (v), deriving utility
U =
Z 1
0
qf (v)
" 1
" dv
 "
" 1
with " > 0.
A continuum of intermediate goods are used to produce a composite intermediate good Q via a
26Denote 4 = GT +GD GO. It is easy to show that 4 decreases as b decreases to 0 (i.e., larger diusion barriers).
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CES production function with  > 0,27
Q =
Z 1
0
q(u)1 1=du
=( 1)
Each intermediate tradable good is produced by a Cobb-Douglas production function using
composite aggregate intermediate good and labor. Let s(u) be the labor used to produce a given
tradable q(u) and let Qm(u) be the level of the composite aggregate. The production technology
for individual intermediate good q(u) is assumed to be
q(u) = x(u) s(u)Qm(u)1 : (3.1)
where  is the labor share. Total factor productivity (TFP) levels are reected by x(u)  and vary
across goods u. As in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2007), the individual x(u)
(\costs" variable, i.e., the inverses of TFP) are random variables, independent across goods, with
a common density g. Note that a low x-value means a high productivity level. Since intermediate
goods dier only in their costs x(u), and all goods q(u) enter symmetrically in the aggregate, thus,
as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007), I relabel intermediate good u by its cost draw, x > 0, and rewrite
the aggregate Q in the form
Q =
Z 1
0
q(x)1 1=g(x)dx
=( 1)
(3.2)
where q(x) is production of individual tradable good x. Assume that the density g is exponential
with parameter  where  is the stock of knowledge or technology state parameter: x  exp().28
For each individual good u, there are two types of technologies (exclusive and diusive technology)
which can be used to produce u. The buyers pick the lowest cost from these two independent
productivity draws. Therefore, as mentioned in section 2, x = minfxE ; xDg, where xE and xD are
assumed to be independent. Also assume that xE  exp(E) and xD  exp(D). Then  = E+D
by the properties of exponential distribution.29 Hence, in a closed economy, dierentiating between
two types of technology does not change the equilibrium, and the only dierence is that the current
state of technology  has two components: E and D. When diusive knowledge does not exist
(i.e.,  = E), the model is going back to Alvarez and Lucas (2007).30 However, this distinction
will change the open economy equilibrium in section 3.2.
Rewriting equation (3.2) with density function of exponential distribution yields
Q =


Z 1
0
e xq(x)1 1=dx
=( 1)
(3.3)
27It is also called a Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz (SDS) aggregate.
28Pr[X  x] = 1  e x. The random variables x  then have a Frechet distribution.
29The stock of knowledge is the sum of exclusive knowledge and diusive knowledge. Also see footnote 18.
30In Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and Eaton and Kortum (2002), all technology is implicitly assumed to be exclusive
to its home country which is a special case in the present model, i.e., D = 0,  = E .
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where  is the parameter of the exponential distribution from which the productivity draw is
realized. Then restate the production function of the individual tradable good as
q(x) = x s(x)Qm(x)1 : (3.4)
Similar to tradable goods, nontradable goods are produced by a Cobb-Douglas function of Qf
composite intermediate good and the labor input sf with labor share . As nontradable goods are
produced by tradable intermediate goods, nontradable sector is also assumed to have productivity
shocks that follows a productivity-shock distribution. Here, the paper diers from Alvarez and
Lucas (2007) by modelling productivity shocks in both nontradable and tradable sectors. Hence, the
present model captures varying productivity levels across a continuum of nontradable consumption
goods, while in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) the nal good is a single good. To simplify analysis,
I further assume that the productivity shocks in both tradable and nontradable sectors follow a
country-specic productivity-shock distribution with parameter , where  is a country-specic
knowledge stock parameter, i, in a multi-country setting in Section 3.2.
31 Therefore, the cost
parameter associated with nontradable goods is denoted by ~x(v) where ~x  exp(). The production
function of the nal goods is given by
qf (~x) = ~x
 sf (~x)Qf (~x)1 : (3.5)
In per capita terms, the resource constraints imply that

Z 1
0
e ~xsf (~x)d~x+ 
Z 1
0
e xs(x)dx = 1; (3.6)
Qm +Qf = Q; (3.7)
where
Qm = 
Z 1
0
e xQm(x)dx; Qf = 
Z 1
0
e ~xQf (~x)d~x: (3.8)
Let the unit price of individual tradables be p(x). Denote the unit price of aggregate composite
tradable goods by pm. Finally, let the unit price of nontradable goods be pf (~x). In the equilibrium,
p(x) = xBwp1 m (3.9)
where B =  (1  ) 1. The unit cost of input bundle for tradable good is cT = Bwp1 m and
31Assuming country-specic productivity shocks in both tradable and nontradable sectors is a common practice
in the recent development of international macroeconomics literature, for example, Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc
(2008), Caselli, Koren, Lisicky, and Tenreyro (2011), among others. Rodrguez-Clare (2007) and Ramondo and
Rodrguez-Clare (2009, forthcoming) also have the virtually similar set-up to address global technology diusion and
multinational production when modelling productivity shocks in both tradable and nontradable sectors. In Ramondo
and Rodrguez-Clare (2009, forthcoming), both tradable and nontradable goods in country i follow a multivariate
Frechet distribution with a common country-specic parameter Ti, which is similar to i in my model.
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the unit price of tradable good is xcT . The unit price p of the nontradable good is
pf (~x) = ~x
Awp1 m (3.10)
where A =  (1   ) 1 and the unit cost of the input bundle for nontradable good is cNT =
Awp1 m . The unit price of nontradable good is ~xcNT . The unit price of aggregate intermediate
is
pm = (CB)
1= =w: (3.11)
where C is a constant.
In this closed Ricardian model, I rst solve for the equilibrium prices pf , pm, and p(x) in terms
of the wage w. Using these prices, I calculate equilibrium quantities. Figure 1 illustrates the cost
structure in closed economy. The detailed derivation of closed economy equilibrium is contained in
Appendix A.
 
Labor, w 
Composite 
Intermediate Good, 
pm 
Input bundle for 
Intermediates, 
cT = Bwβpm
1−β
 
Unit Price for 
Tradable Goods, 
x(u)θ cT 
Input bundle for 
Consumption, 
cNT = Awαpm
1−α
 
Unit Price for Non-
tradable Consumption 
Goods,   x#(v)θcNT 
Figure 1: The cost structure in closed economy
3.2 General Equilibrium
Consider an equilibrium in a world of I countries, all with the structure described in section 3.1,
in which merchandise trade is balanced. Note that dierentiating between exclusive and diusive
technology does not change the closed economy equilibrium, but does impact the open economy
case.
The cost draws are independent across countries and across two types of technologies: xEi 
exp(Ei ) and x
D
i  exp(Di ) for country i. A new notation for the commodity space is needed. Let
xE and xD be two vectors: xE = (xE1 ; x
E
2 ; :::; x
E
I ), x
D = (xD1 ; x
D
2 ; :::; x
D
I ). Use qn(x
E ; xD) for the
consumption of tradable good (xE ; xD) in country n, and Qn for consumption of the aggregates in
country n. Let pn(x
E ; xD) be the prices paid for tradable good (xE ; xD) by producers in country
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n. Let pmn be the price in country n for a unit of the aggregate.
Analogous to Section 2, all tradable goods producers in country n buy at the same (lowest)
price:
pn(x
E ; xD) = minfmin
i
(xEi )
cTi =kni;min
i;m
(xDi )
cTmi=knmg
= min

min
i
(xEi )
 c
T
i
kni
;min
i;m
(xDi )
 c
T
m
bmiknm
 (3.12)
where cTi = Bw

i p
1 
mi , i = 1; :::; I. The rst term on the RHS minimizes over all ways in which
country n can procure the tradable goods conditional on using exclusive technology, which precludes
diusive technology and implies importing goods from the country where the exclusive technology
originates. The second term on the RHS minimizes over all possible ways in which country n
can procure the tradable goods conditional on using diusive technology, which allows for tech-
nology diusion from i to the production country (intermediary country) m for all possible fi;mg
combinations.
Then I derive an expression for the price index of tradable aggregates pmn,
pmn(w) = CB
 
IX
i=1
 ni
! 
 (CB)
0@ IX
i=1
0@ wi pmi(w)1 
kni
! 1=
Ei +minm
 
wmpmm(w)
1 
bmiknm
! 1=
Di
1A1A 
(3.13)
where i;m = 1; :::; I, and C is the constant dened in Appendix A.
Following Alvarez and Lucas (2007), I view (3.13) as a system of I equations in the prices
pm = (pm1; pm2; :::; pmI), to be solved for pm as a function of the wage vector w. This price index
diers from the price formulas in Eaton and Kortum (2002) (equation (7) and (9)) and in Alvarez
and Lucas (2007) (equation (3.8)) in the second term in RHS, which captures technology diusion.
Without diusion, letting all technology be exclusive (Ei = i, i = 1; 2; :::; I), the model collapses
to Alvarez and Lucas (2007). With diusion, both trade costs k and diusion barriers b impact the
price index.
The analysis in Section 2.2 to compute total imports of goods by country n from country i is
still valid with three changes. First, the value of intermediate goods produced with the exclusive
technology in country i that are exported to country n is no longer EniXn but 
E
niX
T
n , where X
T
n is
total spending on intermediates by country n. Similarly, total imports by country n from country
i of intermediate goods produced with diusive technology are now
P
j 
D
nijX
T
n . Then, total value
of imports of goods by country n from i 6= n is given by
Mni = 
E
niX
T
n +
X
j
DnijX
T
n : (3.14)
17
Hence, imports of goods are comprised of two parts: the tradable goods produced by exclusive
technology captured by the rst term and the tradable goods produced by diusive technology
captured by the second term.
Next I calculate the tradables expenditure shares for each country n: the fraction Dni of country
n's total per capita spending pmnQn on tradables that is spent on goods from country i. Since
XTn = pmnQnLn, from (3.14) and (3.13) I have the expression of bilateral merchandise import share
in total spending on tradable goods Dni
Dni = 
E
ni +
X
j
Dnij
= (CB) 1=
8<:
 
wi pmi(w)
1 
pmn(w)kni
! 1=
Ei +
X
j
24yDnij minm
 
wmpmm(w)
1 
pmn(w)bmjknm
! 1=
Dj
359=;
(3.15)
Note that
P
iDni =
P
i 
E
ni+
P
i
P
j y
D
nij
D
nj
n
= 1 because
P
i y
D
nij = 1, and the \complementary slack-
ness" conditions in Section 2.2 still hold.
Equation (3.15) can be compared with the import share formula (3.10) in Alvarez and Lucas
(2007) and the dierence is the second term in RHS due to technology diusion. When all tech-
nology is exclusive technology (i.e., Ei = i), (3.15) is exactly the same formula with the one in
Alvarez and Lucas (2007).
The total value associated with inward technology diusion MDni from country i to country n
is comprised of two parts: inward technology diusion used in tradable goods, MD;Tni , plus the
corresponding value for consumption goods, MD;NTni ,
MDni =M
D;T
ni +M
D;NT
ni =
X
j
DjniX
T
j +
'Dni
'n
Xn (3.16)
and 'n  'Enn +
P
i '
D
ni, where '
E
nn = (c
NT
n )
 1=En reects the impact of exclusive technology on
nontradable goods, and 'Dni = (c
NT
ni )
 1=Di reects the impact of diusive technology on nontrad-
able goods. The second term in 'n suggests that country n can use diusive technology from all
possible technology source country i in its nontradable sector. This changes the price of consump-
tion goods.
Total spending on nal goods by country n is Xn = wnLn. It can be shown that total spending
on tradable intermediate goods is XTn =

1 


Xn (see Appendix A). Thus total merchandise
imports by country n from i are
Mni =

1  

0@Eni +X
j
Dnij
1AwnLn (3.17)
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Imposing trade balance condition yieldsX
i 6=n
Mni =
X
i6=n
Min (3.18)
Aggregate imports for country n are simply Mn =
P
i6=nMni. Trade share for country n is
Vn =Mn=(wnLn) or Vn = (1 Dnn)(1 )=. Diusion share for country n is V Dn =MDn =(wnLn) =
(
P
i6=nM
D
ni)=(wnLn). The bilateral diusion share in country n's total spending is simplyM
D
ni=(wnLn).
Balanced trade requires that the dollar payments for tradables owing into n from the rest of
the world must equal the payments owing out of n to the rest of the world. Firms in n spend a
total of XTn = pmnQnLn dollars on tradables. The amount pmnQnLn
PI
i=1Dni = pmnQnLn reaches
sellers in all countries. Buyers in country i spend a total of pmiQiLiDin dollars for tradables from
n. Thus trade balance requires
pmnQnLn =
IX
i=1
pmiQiLiDin: (3.19)
Solving the equilibrium involves nding the zeros of a system Z(w):
Zn(w) =
1
wn
"
IX
i=1
Liwi(1  )Din(w)  Lnwn(1  )
#
(3.20)
As in the closed economy analysis of Section 3.1, the full set of equilibrium prices and quantities are
determined once equilibrium wages are known.32 Once the prices are determined, the equilibrium
quantities can be derived as in the closed economy analysis. The detailed derivation of equilibrium
is contained in Appendix B.
Denition. A competitive equilibrium is characterized by a wage vector w 2 Rn++ such that
Zn(w) = 0 for n = 1; :::; I, where, the price functions for tradable goods pmn(w) satisfy (3.13), the
price functions for nontradable goods pfn satisfy pfn = C'
 
n , the bilateral import share functions
Dni(w) satisfy (3.15), the goods imports from country i to n satisfy (3.17), and the technology
diusion from country i to n satises (3.16).
4 Benchmark
The model parameters are calibrated using data on the value of merchandise trade imports, the value
of payments associated with inward technology diusion (represented by the payments associated
with imports of international trade in royalties, license fees, and information intensive services),
GDP size (as percentage of world GDP), and real GDP per capita for a sample of 31 countries. The
32Alvarez and Lucas (2007) provide a proof that there exists a unique solution to (3.15), given tradable goods
prices.
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calibrated model is used as a benchmark to perform some counterfactual exercises to quantitatively
analyze the welfare gains from reducing trade costs and diusion barriers.
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Figure 2: The magnitude of technology diusion as % of GDP across countries
4.1 Data Description
The sample is comprised of 31 countries, which include nineteen OECD countries plus 12 other
countries. The nineteen OECD countries are the U.S., Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom,
Italy, Canada, Spain, Australia, Netherlands, Belgium/Luxemburg, Sweden, Austria, Denmark,
Norway, Finland, Greece, Portugal, and New Zealand.33 The other 12 countries are China, Brazil,
Mexico, India, Russia, Argentina, Switzerland, Turkey, South Africa, Israel, Ireland and Hungary.
These countries were selected since they are all signicant as percentage of world GDP and they
all have a large aggregate knowledge stock.34 Also, those 31 countries report data on the trade in
royalties and license fees plus information intensive services.35
All data are averages over 1990-2000 (see Appendix C, Table C.1). I use merchandise trade
imports as percentage of GDP from UNCTAD as the empirical counterpart for the trade share Vi
for country i in the model. Data on international technology diusion are constructed based on
the payments data of (i) trade in royalties and license fees, (ii) trade in computer and information
33These 19 OECD countries are also the ones considered by Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Ramondo and Rodrguez-
Clare (2009).
34I use dierent indicators of knowledge stock, for example, the total number of patents in the country, the total
number of patent citations the country receives, and the aggregate royalties and license fees trade (i.e., the sum of
the inward and outward royalties and license fees).
35I try to compare my results with Alvarez and Lucas (2007) which contains 60 countries. Among them, those
31 countries report the data on international technology diusion. Among them, only some OCED countries report
bilateral technology diusion ows. While most developing countries and emerging markets do not report bilateral
technology diusion ows with their trading partners. Therefore, in the calibration part I will focus on country-specic
diusion rather than bilateral diusion.
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services, and (iii) trade in communications services from UNCTAD.36 The latter two parts are
included in the measure of technology diusion because they contain information-related service
transactions which facilitate technology diusion between residents and nonresidents (e.g., hardware
consultancy, software implementation and development of customized systems, maintenance and
repair of computers, business network services such as teleconferencing and support service) based
on IMF (1993, pp. 66-67). However, to check the robustness of my results, I also use an alternative
method to compute the royalty-only measure of technology diusion and it does not alter the main
results of this paper. The value of inward technology diusion as percentage of GDP is the empirical
counterpart for inward diusion share V Di for country i in the model.
37 Figure 2 illustrates that
inward technology diusion as a percentage of GDP is as high as 16.3% in Ireland and is on average
4% in the sample.38 The size of GDP as a percentage of world GDP from World Development
Indicators (WDI) is the target of Liwi (normalized) for country i in the model. Another moment
condition is the real GDP per capita (PPP adjusted), from Penn World Table. In the model,
this is the ratio of (wiLi)=pfi to population in country i and population data are obtained from
UNCTAD.39 Note that Li is adjusted employment size rather than population, as Li captures the
total number of \equipped-eciency" units available for production, and thus, Li as employment
must be adjusted to account for human and physical capital available per worker (Ramondo and
Rodrguez-Clare, 2009). Following Alvarez and Lucas (2007), I calibrate Li with i.
40
4.2 Calibration Procedure
My procedure is to calibrate some of the model's parameters: knowledge stock (technology state)
parameter i, country-specic trade costs ki, country-specic diusion barriers bi, and the share of
diusive knowledge in the overall knowledge stock Di  Di =i.41 I use the data on trade share,
diusion share, real GDP per capita, and GDP as a percentage of world GDP for 31 countries. To
reduce the number of parameters to calibrate, I assume that the proportion of diusive knowledge
36I also include trade in personal services (e.g. fees for training/provision of courses overseas, teachers abroad,
etc.) in technology diusion since ows of knowledge involve talent migration and human capital training. But the
magnitude of this part is small.
37The diusion share in the model and diusion share in the data are dened slightly dierently. V Di in the model is
the value of goods produced by diusive technologies from abroad. V Di in the data is the value associated with inward
knowledge movement, i.e., import of royalties and license fees plus information intensive services. Using this data
potentially underestimates the real diusion, since payments of royalties and license fees plus information intensive
services usually capture part of the nal value of goods produced by diusive technologies. To check the potential
impact of this, I examine an alternative calibration based on a royalty-calculated method in the robustness checks
(see Section 5.2 and Table C.9) and nd that the main results are not sensitive.
38This magnitude is even larger than R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP. For example, during the same
period, all OECD countries spent around 2.1% of GDP on R&D expenditures.
39Data source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2008).
40Alvarez and Lucas (2007) pursue two approaches to calibrating  and L. First, they assume that  is proportional
to L and calibrate both to match a country's share of nominal world GDP. The second approach uses relative price
data to calibrate  and L separately. They found that both approaches produce similar results. In this paper, I use
the rst approach as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) to match countries size in world GDP distribution.
41To estimate trade costs and diusion barriers, I do two steps. First, I calibrate the simplest version of the model
under the assumption of uniform trade cost k and diusion barrier b. The purpose of the rst step is nding some
reasonable intervals for the nal optimal values to save the computation time. Second, I calibrate country-specic
trade costs and diusion barriers.
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is the same across countries, Ei + 
D
i = i, 
D
i =i = 
D.
The resulting set of parameters to calibrate is
 =
n
figIi=1 ; D; fkigIi=1 ; fbigIi=1 ; ; ; 
o
:
I set the labor share in the tradable sector, , to 0.5, and the labor share in the nal sector, ,
to 0.75, as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007). I select a value of 0.15 for parameter . This is the value
used in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) which reects the variability of productivity across countries and
lies in the middle of empirical estimates. Eaton and Kortum (2002) estimate  using bilateral trade
data as well as prices of individual goods. Their estimates for  are in the range 0.08-0.28, and their
preferred value is 0.12. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) conclude that a reasonable range for the
estimates of the Armington substitution elasticity is [5; 10], which corresponds to  2 [0:11; 0:25].42
See Table 1 for the denition of parameters in the model and how to set their values.
Table 1: Parameters
Parameter Denition Value
 labor share (non-tradable) 0.75 (Alvarez and Lucas, 2007)
 labor share (tradable) 0.5 (Alvarez and Lucas, 2007)
 variability of 0.12 (Eaton and Kortum, 2002)
productivity draws 0.15 (Alvarez and Lucas, 2007)
Di share of diusive technology assume 
D
i = 
D
recovered from real GDP per capita
i technology state (total stock of knowledge) i  Li
Li adjusted employment (size) recovered from GDP share in the world
kni trade costs b/w n and i recovered from trade share
bni diusion barriers b/w n and i recovered from diusion share
My calibration procedure is as follows. First, given ; ; , the initial guess of other parameters
in , and the vector of country GDP sizes as percentage of world GDP, I compute the model's
equilibrium, and generate a simulated data set for the following variables: trade shares, diusion
shares, the real GDP per capita, and the country's GDP share in the world. The algorithm used
to compute the model's equilibrium extends the one in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) using contract
mapping to nd a xed point of wages w that solves for the vector of price index pm(w).
43 The
calibration searches for: (1) the technology state parameters (also the stock of knowledge)

Ii=1
	
recovered from the GDP share in the world such that the absolute dierence of GDP share between
the model prediction and the real data is minimized, as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007);44 (2) the share
of diusive knowledge in overall knowledge stock D, the trade costs ki and the diusion barriers
bi such that the sum of the square dierence of real GDP per capita (gdppi), trade shares (Vi) and
42This is because the connection between these two parameterizations is  = 1=(   1), based on the bilateral
gravity formula.
43The algorithm is described below. First, given the vector of wages w, there exists a function pm(w) that solves
for the vector of price index pm. Second, there is a mapping w
0 = T (w; yT ) whose xed point, w = F (yD), gives the
equilibrium wages given a 3-dimension matrix yDnij . This 3-dimension matrix y
D captures the relationship between
the technology source country, the production country as intermediary, and the destination consumption country in
tradable goods sector. Then the nal step is to solve for the whole equilibrium.
44For simplicity, I follow Alvarez and Lucas (2007) to assume that i  Li.
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diusion shares (V Di ) for all countries between the model and the data is minimized,
IX
i=1

]gdpp
data
i  ]gdpp
model
i
2
+
IX
i=1
eV datai   eV modeli 2 + IX
i=1
gV Di data  gV Di model2 :
In each simulation, I recover technology state parameters

Ii=1
	
from the country's GDP size as
percentage in the world, and use three other moment conditions (real GDP per capita, trade share
and diusion share for each country) to pin down country-specic trade costs ki, country-specic
diusion barriers bi, and the share of diusive knowledge in overall knowledge stock 
D. The three
moment conditions are jointly determined by these three parameters. The whole nonlinear system
is comprised of 93(=313) nonlinear equations and 63(=312+1) unknowns.
The chosen moments are informative about the model's parameters. Intuitively, the sources
of identication are as follows. First,  is the total stock of knowledge, which is believed to be
proportional to the size of an economy, as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007). Therefore, I use GDP
size as a percentage of world GDP to pinpoint . Second, diusion barriers have a greater eect
on diusion shares, while trade costs have a greater eect on trade shares, even though the trade
shares and the diusion shares are jointly determined by both trade costs and diusion barriers.
Third, the share of diusive knowledge is related to real GDP per capita. Increasing the share of
diusive knowledge D eectively increases real GDP per capita, and changing the value of real
GDP per capita leads to a change in the share of diusive knowledge. Hence, I use real GDP
per capita as a moment condition to identify diusive knowledge share. In calibration, the last
three moment conditions are jointly used to identify diusion barriers, trade costs, and the share
of diusive knowledge.
4.3 Benchmark Results
Table 2 reports the calibrated parameters for the benchmark. The calibrated trade cost ki is, on
average, 0.54, which is equivalent to adding 85% tari or shipping costs. This estimate is broadly
consistent with the value of trade costs used in the existing literature. Alvarez and Lucas (2007) do
not calibrate the value of trade costs and used k = 0:75, applied symmetrically to country pairs i; j
with i 6= j. The value 0:75 does not include the eect of taris. Considering taris, the real value
of k is lower than 0:75. Furthermore, Alvarez and Lucas (2007) also note that other statistical
evidence can support k values (trade costs) as low as 0.65. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)
report that for a representative developed country, trade barriers fall in a range between 40{80%,
depending on the approach and elasticity of substitution. Waugh (2010) nds even larger trade
costs: the median trade cost for OECD countries is equivalent to a 90% tari, which is equivalent
to the value of trade costs k of 0.53. My estimate for trade costs is within these reasonable ranges.
The calibrated value of average diusion barriers is b = 0:45. This implies that the barriers to
technology diusion among the sample countries are larger than the trade costs. This result is quite
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Table 2: Parameters (31 countries with country-specic ki and bi)
Parameterized
Parameter Denition Value Previous literature
 labor share (non-tradable) 0.75 0.75 (Alvarez and Lucas, 2007)
 labor share (tradable) 0.5 0.5 (Alvarez and Lucas, 2007)
 variability of productivity 0.15 0.12-0.28 (Eaton and Kortum, 2002)
Calibrated
Parameter Denition Value Previous literature
D share of diusive technology 0.14 N/A
ki trade cost 0.54 0.75 plus tari (Alvarez and Lucas, 2007)
(average 31 countries) 0.65 from statistical evidence
bi diusion barriers 0.45 N/A
(average 31 countries)
interesting because it contradicts some general conjectures by the public that knowledge ows might
take more advantage of communication technology and that it might therefore be the case that, even
though knowledge ows entail barriers, those barriers are lower than the barriers to merchandise
trade ows. However, this paper provides an opposite answer. It specically investigates the
diusion barriers in which technology diusion occurs through market transactions, which can be
viewed as trade in knowledge in a general sense. The calibrated diusion barriers are larger than
merchandise trade costs, which means that merchandise trade is less costly compared to trade in
knowledge.
The calibrated proportion of diusive knowledge in overall knowledge stock is 0.14, which
means that roughly 86% of knowledge stock is exclusive to its home country and that only a
small proportion of knowledge is currently used by foreign countries through market transactions
of diusion. This large share of exclusive technology is consistent with the conventional assumption
in the literature of Ricardian trade, which implicitly assumes that all technology is exclusive (e.g.,
Alvarez and Lucas, 2007; Eaton and Kortum, 2002).
Table 3: Goodness of Fit: Calibrated Model
Model's \Explanatory power":
merchandise trade shares 0.97
technology diusion shares 1.00
real GDP per capita 0.96
GDP size 1.00
Correlations between model and data:
merchandise trade shares 0.92
technology diusion shares 1.00
real GDP per capita 0.97
GDP size 1.00
Table 3 reports the model's explanatory power and the correlation between the model and the
data. A measure of the explanatory power of the model for trade shares R2V , diusion shares R
2
V D
,
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country's GDP size, R2GDP and real GDP per capita R
2
gdpp, respectively, is given by:
R2H = 1 
PI
i=1
 eHdatai   eHmodeli 2PI
i=1
 eHdatai 2 (4.1)
where H = V; V D; GDP; gdpp.
The calibrated model does a very good job in matching GDP size and technology diusion share
as percentage of GDP, and the tness for merchandise trade share and real GDP capita is also
above 95% in terms of explanatory power. In a model without technology diusion, the correlation
coecient between the model generated merchandise trade and the data is 0.59, as in Alvarez and
Lucas (2007). My model generates the correlation as high as 0.92 for merchandise trade share (as
a percentage of a country's GDP). My model replicates most countries very well: if Belgium and
Luxembourg are excluded, the explanatory power for merchandise trade share increases to 0.97,
and the correlation between the model and the data becomes 0.93.45 Figure 3-4 also report the
tness of data and the model. In Figure 3, the left panel compares countries' GDP sizes between
the model and the data. If the model's GDP size is the same as that of the data, then the ordered
pairs would map out a 45o line. Figure 3 shows that the ordered pairs of GDP size lay on the 45o
line. The model also replicates real GDP per capita across countries fairly well. For example, the
model predicts that Finland has a real GDP per capita level that is 0.662 of the U.S. level. In the
data, Finland has a real GDP per capita level that is 0.663 of the U.S. level.
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Figure 3: Country's GDP size and real GDP per capita (Model and Data).
Table C.2 reports trade costs, diusion barriers, GDP size, and technology parameters by coun-
try (see Appendix C). For most countries, calibrated diusion barriers are larger than merchandise
trade costs. However, there are some exceptions; for example, Japan and Switzerland have smaller
diusion barriers than trade costs for goods. Japan usually faces larger trade costs compared to
most other European and North American countries because it is isolated from other countries. At
45Belgium and Luxembourg is an outlier which has merchandise trade share as high as 59%.
25
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION VS SIZE IN THE MODEL (*) AND IN THE DATA (o)
Share of GDP in the sample
In
w
ar
d 
Di
ffu
sio
n 
to
 G
DP
 ra
tio
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
MERCHANDISE TRADE VS SIZE IN THE MODEL (*) AND IN THE DATA (o)
Share of GDP in the sample
Im
po
rts
 to
 G
DP
 ra
tio
Figure 4: Merchandise trade and technology diusion shares vs. GDP size (Model and Data).
the same time, Japan is one of the largest technology producers in the world and has relatively large
knowledge stock. Switzerland is dierent from other European countries in terms of its distinct
intellectual property law system, which helps its market transactions of technology diusion. It is
therefore unsurprising that Japan and Switzerland have smaller diusion barriers than merchandise
trade costs.
Furthermore, diusion barriers show less variation across countries than do trade costs: the
variance of trade costs (0.016) is almost four times that of diusion barriers (0.004). This suggests
that trade costs for goods are more asymmetric across countries while countries are facing more
equalization in technology diusion barriers. The potential reasons are as follows. Merchandise
trade is more likely aected by physical trade barriers such as geographic ones, which include
distance and borders. Such physical barriers are hard to diminish, and to some extent, they are
inherent characteristics of a country. Conversely, even though physical distance and borders can
also impede knowledge ows, technology diusion might be more aected by institutional, cultural,
and legal factors, for example, human capital levels and the legislation of intellectual property
right. Such factors are amenable to change by policy instruments. My sample does not include
many less developed countries; therefore, the dierences between those factors across countries are
not as large as the barriers to merchandise trade. Further exploration of dierent factors that could
impede technology diusion and the importance of each factor are outside the scope of this paper,
and these issues are left for future research.
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Table 4: Welfare Gains (%)
(consumption equivalence)
(log(con1=con0))  100
From benchmark to: Average 31 countries Maximum among 31 countries
free trade and free diusion 59.55 113.58
(k = 1; b = 1)
only free trade in goods 25.28 37.92
(k = 1)
only free technology diusion 33.60 59.30
(b = 1)
shutting down trade in goods -5.18 -17.78
(k = 0)
shutting down technology diusion -0.62 -2.67
(b = 0)
shutting down both -5.80 -20.45
(k = 0; b = 0)
5 Counterfactual Exercises and Robustness
5.1 Counterfactual Exercises
In order to quantitatively examine the change in welfare gains and the cross-country distribution
of GDP from reducing trade costs and diusion barriers, I perform two counterfactual exercises
based on the benchmark model to analyze the change of welfare gains in terms of both consumption
equivalence and real GDP per capita. First, what would happen if trade costs and diusion barriers
were eliminated? I consider three cases: only removing diusion barriers, only removing trade costs,
and removing both trade costs and diusion barriers. Second, what would happen if the world
moved to autarky? I also consider three subcases here: only abolishing diusion, only abolishing
trade, and complete isolation (abolishing both trade and diusion).
Welfare Gains
Table 4 presents the change of consumption equivalence under dierent scenarios.46 I nd that
the welfare boom from free diusion (i.e., b goes to 1) is larger than that from free trade (i.e.,
k goes to 1). I use log change in percentage to denote the change of welfare. The consumption
increment from removing diusion barriers is, on average, 34%, which is larger than the average
welfare increase from removing trade costs, 25%. Unsurprisingly, removing both trade costs and
diusion barriers present the largest welfare increase, which is, on average across countries, 60%.
Comparing the benchmark to autarky provides a measure of the existing gains from trade and
technology diusion. The results suggest that the existing gains from trade is larger than the
existing gains from diusion, while the potential gains from diusion are larger than the potential
gains from trade. Based on Table 4, abolishing only merchandise trade (i.e., k goes to 0) leads
to more welfare losses compared to abolishing diusion alone (i.e., b goes to 0), and most of the
welfare loss of moving to autarky (i.e., abolishing both trade and diusion) is due to abolishing
46In the model, the consumption equivalence is equal to the real wage w=pf .
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merchandise trade. This suggests that the world may have already exploited more benets of
merchandise trade cost reduction than from diusion barrier reduction (i.e., from prohibitive trade
costs or from prohibitive diusion barriers to the benchmark), while in future, the potential gains
from free diusion are larger than from free trade (i.e., from the benchmark to free diusion or to
free trade). The implication of this nding is that greater investigation of policy instruments that
may reduce diusion barriers may be warranted. Table C.3 reports the change in welfare gains by
country (see Appendix C).
The welfare gains from free merchandise trade alone are consistent with those of Alvarez and
Lucas (2007). For example, Alvarez and Lucas (2007) calculated the upper bounds of gains of
moving from autarky to free (merchandise) trade in terms of consumption equivalence for the U.S.,
Japan, and Denmark as 10%, 14%, and 38%, respectively. My results for these three countries are
10%, 15%, and 36%, respectively. When both diusion and trade are permitted, the overall gains
are larger: 15% for the U.S., 25% for Japan, and 77% for Denmark. Here, small countries benet
more than large countries do from both merchandise trade and technology diusion because of the
market size eect. Once trade costs or diusion barriers are eliminated, countries enjoy the global
market without friction. The result is that small countries can benet from larger outside markets
than they were able to previously, while big countries (e.g., the U.S., Japan) already have large
domestic markets and thus benet less from reducing trade costs or diusion barriers. This market
size eect occurs both in merchandise trade and technology diusion. Therefore, when diusion
is included, a small country (e.g., Denmark) enjoys a larger welfare increase than do big countries
(e.g., the U.S. and Japan).
The gains from diusion in this paper are smaller than those of Rodrguez-Clare (2007).
Rodrguez-Clare (2007) calculated the overall gains from both trade and diusion to be between
206% and 240% for a country with approximately 1% of the world's GDP. My results for overall
gains from trade and diusion for a similar country are around 69%-73%. The reasons are twofold.
First, Rodrguez-Clare (2007) bases his work on the growth rate of a country, and no data asso-
ciated with technology diusion are directly used in that paper. I used market transaction data
to directly quantify the gains from technology diusion, resulting in their precise lower bound.
Second, technology diusion entails no trade costs or diusion barriers in the literature. Therefore,
gains from diusion in this paper should be smaller than those of Rodrguez-Clare (2007).
Another measure of welfare gains is real GDP per capita, reported in Table 5. The results are
consistent with the consumption equivalence measure: the increase of real GDP per capita from free
diusion is larger than that from free trade, and abolishing trade leads to larger welfare losses than
does abolishing diusion. The change in real GDP per capita by country is reported in Appendix
C (Table C.4).
The nontradable sector plays a key role in the gains from diusion. If I do not allow for diusion
in nontradable goods, the gains from free trade (average 25.30%) will be larger than those from free
diusion (average 0.04%), but the overall gains will be smaller than those of the benchmark. The
reason is that diusive technology has a limited eect on tradable goods due to the substitution
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Table 5: Change of Real GDP Per Capita (%)
(log(gdpp1=gdpp0))  100
From benchmark to: Average 31 countries Maximum among 31 countries
free trade and free diusion 46.16 100.19
(k = 1; b = 1)
only free trade in goods 16.71 29.35
(k = 1)
only free technology diusion 28.79 54.50
(b = 1)
shutting down trade in goods -3.90 -16.66
(k = 0)
shutting down technology diusion -0.52 -2.54
(b = 0)
shutting down both -4.46 -19.20
(k = 0; b = 0)
Table 6: Dispersion of Real GDP Per Capita
Scenario var[log(gdpp)] gdpp90=gdpp10 Gini index
Benchmark 1.3943 10.2352 0.3564
free technology diusion 1.3613 8.5727 0.3415
free trade in goods 1.3487 8.8042 0.3483
eect between merchandise trade and technology diusion in tradable goods. That is, obtaining
foreign technology to produce goods locally decreases the incentive to import goods. This result is
consistent with and echoes the previous studies of extending Eaton-Kortum (2002) to include FDI
or MP, where the existence of the substitution eect is also conrmed. Because technology diusion
substitutes for merchandise trade, diusion of technology benets nontradable goods more than it
does tradable goods. If no diusion occurs in the nontradable sector, it shuts down a substantial
channel for the impact of technology diusion. Table C.5 reports the welfare comparison result
from allowing for diusion only in the tradable sector.
Cross-country Distribution of GDP
I examine the change in cross-country distribution of GDP in terms of real GDP per capita. Free
merchandise trade and free technology diusion increase real GDP per capita by 5{30% and 4{55%,
respectively. In both cases, the dispersion of real GDP per capita across countries is reduced. Table
6 provides some summary statistics: the variance of log real GDP per capita, the 90/10 percentile
ratio, and the Gini index across countries. Except for the variance of log real GDP per capita, the
summary statistics indicate that free diusion contributes only slightly more to the reduction of
dispersion of GDP across countries than does free trade. The Gini index of real GDP per capita
across countries is decreased by 4% due to moving from the benchmark to free technology diusion
and by 2% due to moving from the benchmark to free merchandise trade. This is consistent with
the rst nding that free technology diusion generates larger gains than does free merchandise
trade. Table C.4 in Appendix C presents the change of real GDP per capita by country. The market
size eect also impacts the change of real GDP per capita. Table C.4 shows that some small rich
countries (e.g., Norway, Finland) benet more than do relatively poor, big countries (e.g., China,
India).
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Impact of Diusion on Trade Flows
I examine the change of trade volume due to the change of diusion barriers to investigate
the impact of diusion on trade ows. By only removing the diusion barriers, the trade shares
slightly increase for all countries (see Table C.6 in Appendix C). Removing trade costs substantially
increases trade shares. Finally, by removing both trade costs and diusion barriers, trade shares
reach their highest levels. The underlying mechanism is that free diusion makes countries more
likely obtain higher productivity draws from abroad through diusion. This encourages countries
to be more specialized in production, and many countries will serve as intermediaries that export
goods produced by foreign technology. Therefore, diusion improves countries' potential ability
to export goods to global markets. This is the complementarity eect, resulting in trade shares
increasing after the removal of diusion barriers.
This result diers from Section 2 under symmetry because no intermediary countries exist in a
symmetric world; therefore, only the substitution eect exists. This means that for tradable goods,
if a country obtains more foreign technology through diusion to produce goods locally, its incentive
to import those goods decreases. My quantitative result suggests that in an asymmetric world, the
substitution eect is dominated by the complementarity eect. This implies that removing diusion
barriers has \spillover" eects on merchandise trade, which supports the rst two ndings about
the change in welfare and in real GDP per capita due to the removal of trade costs and diusion
barriers. In summary, free diusion has greater welfare impact and contributes more to reducing
the dispersion of real GDP per capita than does free merchandise trade.
5.2 Robustness
One potential issue is that the diusive technology share D might depend on the diusion barriers
since lower diusion barriers should make diusion more likely across national borders, and increase
diusive technology share. If so, the welfare gains with xed D for the eect of removing the
diusion barriers would be a lower bound. This share of diusive technology is also related to
extensive margin in technology market. It is interesting to compare the extensive margin (how
much technology at aggregate level is diused) and the intensive margin (how much technology
diusion each rm obtains). The task is promising and challenging where more technology diusion
data at rm level are needed.
To quantify the impact of varying D as well as to check the sensitivity of calibration results,
I recalibrate the model using dierent values of D (see Table C.7).47 The value for trade costs
is relatively stable, and does not change much according to dierent values of diusive technology
share D. This partially echoes the previous identication strategy that trade costs have a greater
eect on trade shares, and hence the parameter of trade costs is mainly pinned down by the data of
trade volume. The value of diusion barriers b is decreasing when D goes to 1. This implies that
if more technology is diusive, the higher diusion barriers are necessary to t the data. In the
47I use uniform trade costs and diusion barriers in the sensitivity tests to save computation time.
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extreme case, when the share of diusive technology approaches 1, this gives average welfare gains
from removing diusion barriers of 34.8% (see Table C.8), just larger than the average gains in
the benchmark 33.6% (see Table 4).48 But it increases the maximum welfare increment to 82.1%,
compared to the previous value 59.3% in Table 4. Therefore, it is safe to say that the average
welfare increment from free diusion is not sensitive to the value change of diusive technology
share D.
To check the potential impact of dierent denitions of the diusion share, I calibrate using
royalties and license fees only, to calculate the value of goods produced by diusive technology based
on royalties and license fees. According to the statistical analysis of royalty rates from the License
Executives Society, many industries use about 5% of the selling price as a typical royalty rate, but
rates can vary from 0.1 to 25% or more and depend on the industry. I use average 5% royalty rate
to calculate the value of goods produced by diusive technology (V Di ) for all countries except for
Ireland. I use the average royalty rate 20% (software industry) for Ireland. Thus, I construct a
rough measure of total value of goods produced by diusive technology using imports of royalties
and license fees. Its share of GDP is on average 8% in the sample, which doubles the previous
data on royalties and license fees plus information intensive services. This is a royalty-calculated
method.49
I report the results from the royalty-calculated method in Table C.9 which presents the results
of welfare changes using the larger diusion share data by royalty-calculated method to recalibrate
the model and to redo the counterfactual exercises. The main results are robust to this alternative
calibration approach: the welfare gains from free technology diusion are still larger than the
gains from free trade. Both the average and maximum welfare gains do not change much and are
consistent with the intuition, i.e., increasing diusion share slightly increases the gains from free
diusion and decreases the gains from free trade. The overall gains from free both diusion and
trade are increased.
6 Conclusion
This paper constructs and calibrates a general equilibrium model to assess the impact of tech-
nology diusion and merchandise trade on welfare gains and cross-country distribution of GDP.
The model features some countries as intermediaries that export goods produced by diusive tech-
nology through technology diusion. In the model, the merchandise trade share and technology
diusion share are jointly determined in equilibrium. Using the data on payments associated with
international technology diusion, I calibrate the model to match the world GDP distribution, the
48Meanwhile, it is not surprising to note that assuming all technology as diusive technology suppresses the gains
from free trade compared to the benchmark.
49Because not all royalties and license fees are through royalty rates, some of them are xed fees. It is possible
to overestimate the real value of goods produced by diusive technology. To be safe, in the benchmark, I use the
rst method based on payments associated with trade in royalties and license fees plus information intensive services.
Those payments are on average 4% of GDP in the sample.
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technology diusion shares, the merchandise trade shares, and real GDP per capita for a sample
of 31 countries. The calibrated model matches the technology diusion and merchandise trade
patterns, as well as GDP size and real GDP per capita across countries, fairly well.
I nd that the welfare gains from removing diusion barriers are generally larger than those from
removing merchandise trade costs. This implies that the world has exploited more of the potential
gains from reductions in the barriers to merchandize trade than from reductions in the barriers to
technology diusion. Potential gains from further reduction of barriers to technology diusion in the
future are higher than those from further reduction in trade costs. Removing diusion barriers also
increases merchandise trade, because countries are more likely to achieve higher productivity from
obtaining foreign technology through diusion and therefore improve their ability to export to the
global market. Consequently, free technology diusion has greater welfare impact and contributes
more to reducing the dispersion of real GDP per capita than does free merchandise trade. This
calls for more attention to be paid to policies that help to reduce diusion barriers.
A strong assumption in this paper is that knowledge stock is exogenous, and that countries use
existing knowledge for technology diusion. If this assumption were relaxed, Eaton and Kortum
(2006) predict that the gains from merchandise trade would not be aected by endogenous research
eorts. However, the gains from technology diusion have not been studied in a framework that
encompasses both endogenous knowledge creation and trade. It is expected that endogenous knowl-
edge creation would provide an incentive to knowledge producers and would potentially impact the
pattern of technology specialization and the diusion process across countries. A thorough analysis
of this issue seems fruitful and is left for future research. Another limitation of this paper is that
the current ndings are based on the assumption that country-specic diusion barriers and trade
costs exist between each country and the rest of the world as its partner. A more satisfactory
model should capture bilateral diusion barriers and trade costs between country pairs. If bilateral
diusion data are available, the model could be adapted to analyze the interaction between bilat-
eral technology diusion and bilateral merchandise trade. Finally, addressing the issue of extensive
versus intensive margins in the technology market is also worthy of exploring in future research.
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Appendix
Appendix A and Appendix B are not intended for publication but for the perusal of the referees.
A Derivation of Closed Economy Equilibrium
Let the unit price of individual tradables be p(x). Denote the unit price of aggregate composite
tradable goods by pm. Finally, let the unit price of nontradable goods be pf (~x). Producers of
all kinds will choose purchases of the individual tradable goods so as to obtain the composite
intermediate at minimum unit cost pm. Their question is
pmQ = min
q(x)

Z 1
0
e xp(x)q(x)dx
subject to 

Z 1
0
e xq(x)1 1=dx
=( 1)
 Q:
This problem is solved by the function
q(x) =


Z 1
0
e xp(u)1 du
=(1 )
p(x) Q: (A.1)
Solving q(x), it follows that the price index of composite intermediate is
pm =


Z 1
0
e xp(x)1 dx
1=(1 )
: (A.2)
The quantity of the individual tradable goods can be restated as
q(x) = pmp(x)
 Q: (A.3)
Similarly, given the price w of the labor input and the aggregate tradable goods price pm,
tradable goods producer will choose the quantity of labor and aggregate inputs so as to minimize
the expenditures on inputs. Hence, he will solve
p(x)q(x) = min
s;Qm
[ws+ pmQm]
subject to
x sQ1 m  q(x):
This problem is solved by
s(x) = x


1  
1  pm
w
1 
q(x) (A.4)
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Qm(x) = x


1  

  w
pm

q(x) (A.5)
It follows that
p(x) = xBwp1 m (A.6)
where B =  (1  ) 1. The unit cost of input bundle for tradable good is cT = Bwp1 m and
the unit price of tradable good is xcT .
Finally, given the price w of the labor input and the composite intermediate price pm, a nal
goods producer will solve
pf (~x)qf (~x) = min
sf ;Qf
[wsf + pmQf ]
subject to
~x sfQ
1 
f  qf (~x):
This problem is solved by the values
sf (~x) =


1  
1  pm
w
1 
qf (~x) (A.7)
Qf (~x) =

1  

 w
pm

qf (~x) (A.8)
It follows that the unit price p of the nal good is
pf (~x) = ~x
Awp1 m (A.9)
where A =  (1  ) 1 and the unit cost of the input bundle for nal good is cNT = Awp1 m .
The unit price of nal good is ~xcNT .
Combining (A.2) and (A.6) and using the change of variable z = x, we have
pm =


Z 1
0
e x

Bxwp1 m
1 
dx
1=(1 )
= Bwp1 m 
 
Z 1
0
e zz(1 )dz
1=(1 ) (A.10)
We write C(; ), or sometimes just C, for
C(; ) =
Z 1
0
e zz(1 )dz
1=(1 )
: (A.11)
C is a constant since the integral in brackets is the Gamma function  (), evaluated at the argument
 = 1 + (1  ). Convergence of the integral requires 1 + (1  ) > 0, which we assume to hold
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throughout the paper.50 Then we rewrite (A.10) as
pm = CBw
p1 m 
 
Solving for pm yields
pm = (CB)
1= =w: (A.12)
Substituting from (A.12) back into (A.6) then yields the prices of individual tradeables:
p(x) = C(1 )=B1=x (1 )=w: (A.13)
The price of the nal good is, from (A.9) and (A.12),
pf = A(CB)
(1 )=~x (1 )=w: (A.14)
To calculate the equilibrium quantities, we use the share formula as follows. The shares of labor
and intermediate inputs in the output value of each tradable good x are  and 1   respectively.
Then the same equality must obtain for the composite aggregate:
 =
w(1  sf )
pmQ
and 1   = Qm
Q
(A.15)
Using (3.7) we have Qf = Q and then the relative price formula (A.12) gives
1  sf = (CB)1= =Qf : (A.16)
Another equation of sf and Qf can be obtained from (A.7) and (A.8):
sf
Qf
=


1  
pm
w

:
Using (A.12) again, we obtain
sf
Qf
=


1  

(CB)1=  = (A.17)
Combining two equations (A.16) and (A.17), we can solve for sf and Qf :
sf =  and Qf = (1  )(CB) 1== : (A.18)
From these equations, all equilibrium quantities can be calculated, just as equilibrium prices
can be calculated from (A.12)-(A.14).
50Rodrguez-Clare (2007) explains why this assumption holds.
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B Derivation of Open Economy Equilibrium
Let g(xE ; xD) and G(xE ; xD) be the joint density and the joint distribution respectively, of xE
and xD, where xE and xD are two vectors: xE = (xE1 ; x
E
2 ; :::; x
E
I ), x
D = (xD1 ; x
D
2 ; :::; x
D
I ). Use
qn(x
E ; xD) for the consumption of tradable good (xE ; xD) in country n, and Qn for consumption
of the aggregates in country n,
Qn =
Z
qn(x
E ; xD)1 1=g(xE ; xD)d(xE ; xD)
=( 1)
=
Z
qn(x
E ; xD)1 1=dG(xE ; xD)
=( 1) (B.1)
Let pn(x
E ; xD) be the prices paid for tradable good (xE ; xD) by producers in country n. Let
pmn =
Z
pn(x
E ; xD)dG(xE ; xD)
1=(1 )
(B.2)
be the price in country n for a unit of the aggregate. Analogous to previous section, we have
qn(x
E ; xD) = pmnpn(x
E ; xD) Qn; n = 1; :::; I: (B.3)
All producers in n buy at the same, lowest price:
pn(x
E ; xD) = minfmin
i
(xEi )
cTi =kni;min
i;m
(xDi )
cTmi=knmg
= min

min
i
(xEi )
 c
T
i
kni
;min
i;m
(xDi )
 c
T
m
bmiknm
 (B.4)
where cTi = Bw

i p
1 
mi , i = 1; :::; I.
Then we derive an expression for pmn from (B.2) and (B.4). The derivation is based on two
properties of the exponential distribution.51 Then from (B.2), we obtain
p1 mn =
Z
pn(x
E ; xD)1 dG(xE ; xD); (B.5)
From (B.4), we have
pn(x
E ; xD)1= = B1=min
(
min
i
"
w
=
i p
(1 )=
mi
k
1=
ni
xEi
#
;min
i;m
"
w
=
m p
(1 )=
mm
(bmiknm)1=
xDi
#)
(B.6)
By properties of exponential distribution, we have that zEi  w=i p(1 )=mi k 1=ni xEi is exponen-
51These properties are: (1) if x  exp() and k > 0 then kx  exp(=k); and (2) if x and y are independent,
x  exp() and y  exp(), then minfx; yg  exp(+ ).
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tially distributed with parameter
 Eni =
 
wi p
1 
mi
kni
! 1=
Ei (B.7)
and zDi  minm
n
w
=
m p
(1 )=
mm (bmiknm)
 1=xDi
o
is exponentially distributed with parameter
 Dni = minm
 
wmp
1 
mm
bmiknm
! 1=
Di (B.8)
Then zi  minifzEi ; zDi g is exponentially distributed with parameter  ni   Eni +  Dni.52 Applying
the property of exponential distribution again yields that pn(x
E ; xD)1= is exponentially distributed
with parameter
 = B 1= n where  n 
IX
i=1
 ni
Let u = pn(x
E ; xD)1=. It then follows from (B.5) that
p1 mn = 
Z 1
0
u(1 )e udu:
Using the change of variable z = u, we obtain that
p1 mn = 
 (1 )
Z 1
0
e zz(1 )dz =  (1 )C1 
where C = C(; ) is the constant dened in section 3.1. Then
pmn(w) = CB
 
IX
i=1
 ni
! 
 (CB)
0@ IX
i=1
0@ wi pmi(w)1 
kni
! 1=
Ei +minm
 
wmpmm(w)
1 
bmiknm
! 1=
Di
1A1A 
(B.9)
where i;m = 1; :::; I.
We then calculate the total value of goods associated with inward technology diusion MDni
from country i to country n. Compared to the simple model with only tradable sector, now MDni is
comprised of two parts: technology diusion used in tradable goods, MD;Tni , plus the corresponding
value for technology diusion used in consumption goods, MD;NTni . Since these goods are non-
tradable, it is necessary to derive an expression for the share of consumption goods v bought by
country n that are produced with diused technology from country i. Hence, I need the explicit
52Compared to Section 2 with only tradable sector, there is a positive constant correlation between  and , where
  = B  .
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price formula for nal goods, pf . Similar to tradable goods price (B.4), in country n
pfn(~x
E ; ~xD) = minf(~xEn )cNTn ;min
i
(~xDi )
cNTni g (B.10)
where ~xE  exp(E), ~xD  exp(D), and cNTni = cNTn =bni. Similar to equation (B.9), by properties
of exponential distribution, I derive the price index of nontradable goods in country n
pfn = C'
 
n (B.11)
where 'n plays the similar role for consumption goods as n for intermediate goods, with
'n  'Enn +
X
i
'Dni (B.12)
where 'Enn = (c
NT
n )
 1=En reects the impact of exclusive technology on nontraded goods, and
'Dni = (c
NT
ni )
 1=Di reects the impact of diusive technology on nontraded goods. Once the prices
are determined, the equilibrium quantities can be derived as in the closed economy analysis. The
allocations in the equilibrium have been illustrated in Section 3.2.
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C Data and More Tables
Table C.1: Country Data (ordered by GDP size)
Country Size GDP Merchandise trade technology diusion Real GDP Relative
as % of (imports/GDP) (inward diusion/GDP) per capita population
world GDP (Vi) (V
D
i ) (US=1) (US=1)
United States 27.18 0.10 0.01 1.00 1.00
Japan 15.24 0.07 0.02 0.83 0.46
Germany 7.59 0.20 0.04 0.79 0.30
France 5.05 0.20 0.02 0.72 0.22
United Kingdom 4.31 0.23 0.04 0.69 0.21
Italy 4.20 0.17 0.03 0.73 0.21
China 2.63 0.17 0.02 0.09 4.35
Brazil 2.24 0.07 0.01 0.24 0.59
Canada 2.21 0.28 0.04 0.76 0.11
Spain 2.08 0.19 0.02 0.60 0.14
Mexico 1.40 0.25 0.02 0.27 0.34
Russia 1.39 0.15 0.03 0.27 0.54
Netherland 1.33 0.45 0.07 0.80 0.06
Australia 1.29 0.16 0.03 0.72 0.07
India 1.29 0.10 0.01 0.07 3.48
Switzerland 0.95 0.28 0.03 0.95 0.03
Belgium and Luxembourg 0.94 0.59 0.08 0.79 0.04
Argentina 0.90 0.08 0.02 0.35 0.13
Sweden 0.89 0.24 0.05 0.73 0.03
Turkey 0.87 0.15 0.02 0.17 0.23
Austria 0.73 0.30 0.09 0.83 0.03
Denmark 0.58 0.25 0.04 0.76 0.02
Norway 0.51 0.22 0.05 0.89 0.02
Greece 0.50 0.19 0.02 0.52 0.04
South Africa 0.48 0.19 0.02 0.23 0.15
Finland 0.44 0.23 0.05 0.66 0.02
Portugal 0.38 0.31 0.03 0.48 0.04
Israel 0.32 0.30 0.05 0.60 0.02
Ireland 0.25 0.47 0.16 0.66 0.01
New Zealand 0.19 0.23 0.05 0.55 0.01
Hungary 0.15 0.43 0.07 0.33 0.04
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Table C.2: Country's technology state, GDP, trade costs, and diusion barriers
country i GDP GDP merchandise technology
(calibrated) (data) (model) trade costs diusion barriers
(calibrated) (calibrated)
United States 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6599 0.5878
Japan 0.5008 0.5609 0.5609 0.3541 0.5459
Germany 0.3379 0.2793 0.2793 0.6969 0.5928
France 0.2341 0.1856 0.1856 0.6481 0.5146
United Kingdom 0.2045 0.1585 0.1585 0.6739 0.5370
Italy 0.1975 0.1544 0.1544 0.6020 0.5181
China 0.1299 0.0966 0.0966 0.5528 0.4363
Brazil 0.1053 0.0823 0.0823 0.4025 0.4022
Canada 0.1130 0.0815 0.0815 0.6690 0.4905
Spain 0.1062 0.0764 0.0764 0.5662 0.4562
Mexico 0.0755 0.0517 0.0517 0.5851 0.4092
Russia 0.0734 0.0512 0.0512 0.4754 0.4534
Netherland 0.0642 0.0488 0.0488 0.8777 0.5010
Australia 0.0692 0.0476 0.0476 0.4897 0.4321
India 0.0660 0.0473 0.0473 0.4012 0.3880
Switzerland 0.0493 0.0350 0.0350 0.3505 0.4272
Belgium and Luxembourg 0.0490 0.0345 0.0345 0.7702 0.4764
Argentina 0.0477 0.0332 0.0332 0.3684 0.3838
Sweden 0.0502 0.0326 0.0326 0.5333 0.4503
Turkey 0.0482 0.0320 0.0320 0.4401 0.3773
Austria 0.0422 0.0270 0.0270 0.5808 0.4882
Denmark 0.0344 0.0213 0.0213 0.5075 0.4188
Norway 0.0307 0.0188 0.0188 0.4706 0.4226
Greece 0.0301 0.0184 0.0184 0.4454 0.3640
South Africa 0.0292 0.0178 0.0178 0.4435 0.3577
Finland 0.0268 0.0161 0.0161 0.4696 0.4064
Portugal 0.0233 0.0139 0.0139 0.5321 0.3749
Israel 0.0200 0.0116 0.0116 0.5066 0.3940
Ireland 0.0144 0.0092 0.0092 0.6945 0.4565
New Zealand 0.0129 0.0070 0.0070 0.4172 0.3670
Hungary 0.0097 0.0056 0.0056 0.5874 0.3711
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Table C.3: Change of Log Welfare Gains (%) by Country
(log(con1=con0))  100
country free technology diusion free merchandise trade free both
(b = 1) (k = 1) (b = 1; k = 1)
United States 4.8092 8.5717 13.3915
Japan 9.5632 14.8861 24.4734
Germany 12.7404 14.4825 27.2102
France 16.7876 17.1885 33.9654
United Kingdom 18.0953 17.3614 35.4376
Italy 18.5823 18.9124 37.4897
China 23.7994 22.1311 45.9274
Brazil 26.4951 25.6547 52.1672
Canada 25.2351 20.0558 45.2580
Spain 26.1960 22.9513 49.1375
Mexico 30.8006 24.1553 54.9340
Russia 30.8843 26.8981 57.7847
Netherland 32.1362 13.6487 45.6947
Australia 31.8010 26.9533 58.7529
India 32.6218 28.7790 61.4144
Switzerland 38.9692 31.3746 67.6831
Belgium and Luxembourg 35.9247 18.5349 54.3821
Argentina 37.0011 31.3528 68.3833
Sweden 35.8793 27.5480 63.4089
Turkey 36.9104 30.0825 66.9957
Austria 37.5664 26.7223 64.2530
Denmark 41.2518 30.1195 71.3511
Norway 42.7284 31.8196 74.5354
Greece 43.5285 32.6503 76.1713
South Africa 43.9858 32.9903 76.8435
Finland 44.7932 32.5380 77.3159
Portugal 47.0380 30.8380 77.8386
Israel 48.9556 32.4719 81.3939
Ireland 51.9132 23.7249 75.5522
New Zealand 55.4087 37.9240 93.3167
Hungary 59.3049 30.2992 113.5795
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Table C.4: Real GDP Per Capita and its Change (%) by Country
country benchmark free diusion free trade free both
(log change) (log change) (log change)
United States 1.0000 1.0000 ( - ) 1.0000 ( - ) 1.0000 ( - )
Japan 0.9268 0.9719 ( 4.75 ) 0.9872 ( 6.31 ) 1.0354 ( 11.08 )
Germany 0.9166 0.9923 ( 7.93 ) 0.9725 ( 5.91 ) 1.0525 ( 13.82 )
France 0.7947 0.8958 ( 11.98 ) 0.8662 ( 8.62 ) 0.9762 ( 20.57 )
United Kingdom 0.6978 0.7970 ( 13.29 ) 0.7619 ( 8.79 ) 0.8699 ( 22.05 )
Italy 0.6704 0.7694 ( 13.77 ) 0.7435 ( 10.34 ) 0.8531 ( 24.10 )
China 0.0192 0.0233 ( 18.99 ) 0.0220 ( 13.56 ) 0.0266 ( 32.54 )
Brazil 0.1073 0.1333 ( 21.69 ) 0.1273 ( 17.08 ) 0.1581 ( 38.78 )
Canada 0.6830 0.8378 ( 20.43 ) 0.7661 ( 11.48 ) 0.9393 ( 31.87 )
Spain 0.4579 0.5671 ( 21.39 ) 0.5287 ( 14.38 ) 0.6547 ( 35.75 )
Mexico 0.1308 0.1697 ( 25.99 ) 0.1529 ( 15.58 ) 0.1982 ( 41.54 )
Russia 0.0764 0.0991 ( 26.08 ) 0.0917 ( 18.33 ) 0.1190 ( 44.39 )
Netherland 0.7248 0.9526 ( 27.33 ) 0.7625 ( 5.08 ) 1.0012 ( 32.30 )
Australia 0.5872 0.7691 ( 26.99 ) 0.7057 ( 18.38 ) 0.9242 ( 45.36 )
India 0.0103 0.0136 ( 27.81 ) 0.0126 ( 20.21 ) 0.0167 ( 48.02 )
Switzerland 0.9652 1.3583 ( 34.16 ) 1.2125 ( 22.80 ) 1.6612 ( 54.29 )
Belgium and Luxembourg 0.7439 1.0154 ( 31.12 ) 0.8218 ( 9.96 ) 1.1208 ( 40.99 )
Argentina 0.1899 0.2620 ( 32.19 ) 0.2384 ( 22.78 ) 0.3290 ( 54.99 )
Sweden 0.8326 1.1360 ( 31.07 ) 1.0066 ( 18.98 ) 1.3729 ( 50.02 )
Turkey 0.1079 0.1488 ( 32.10 ) 0.1338 ( 21.51 ) 0.1844 ( 53.60 )
Austria 0.7618 1.0570 ( 32.76 ) 0.9134 ( 18.15 ) 1.2668 ( 50.86 )
Denmark 0.8812 1.2686 ( 36.44 ) 1.0931 ( 21.55 ) 1.5732 ( 57.96 )
Norway 0.9138 1.3351 ( 37.92 ) 1.1529 ( 23.25 ) 1.6842 ( 61.14 )
Greece 0.3614 0.5322 ( 38.72 ) 0.4597 ( 24.08 ) 0.6770 ( 62.78 )
South Africa 0.0896 0.1325 ( 39.18 ) 0.1143 ( 24.42 ) 0.1689 ( 63.45 )
Finland 0.6624 0.9880 ( 39.98 ) 0.8417 ( 23.97 ) 1.2552 ( 63.92 )
Portugal 0.2904 0.4430 ( 42.23 ) 0.3628 ( 22.27 ) 0.5532 ( 64.45 )
Israel 0.4534 0.7050 ( 44.15 ) 0.5758 ( 23.90 ) 0.8949 ( 68.00 )
Ireland 0.5068 0.8118 ( 47.10 ) 0.5898 ( 15.15 ) 0.9437 ( 62.16 )
New Zealand 0.3775 0.6261 ( 50.60 ) 0.5062 ( 29.35 ) 0.8394 ( 79.93 )
Hungary 0.1047 0.1806 ( 54.50 ) 0.1301 ( 21.73 ) 0.2852 ( 100.19 )
Notes: (log(gdppnew=gdppbench))  100 in parentheses.
Table C.5: Change of Log Welfare Gains (%) If Only Diusion in Tradable Sector
(consumption equivalence)
(log(con1=con0))  100
From benchmark to: Average 31 countries Maximum among 31 countries
free trade and diusion 26.0884 54.4346
(k = 1; b = 1)
only free trade 25.2975 38.3504
(k = 1)
only free diusion 0.0369 0.9589
(b = 1)
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Table C.6: Merchandise Trade Share (Vi) by Country Under Dierent Scenarios
country benchmark free diusion free trade free both
United States 0.0870 0.0881 0.3683 0.3688
Japan 0.0199 0.0203 0.4340 0.4343
Germany 0.1930 0.1948 0.4555 0.4557
France 0.1949 0.1966 0.4692 0.4693
United Kingdom 0.2273 0.2291 0.4731 0.4732
Italy 0.1762 0.1777 0.4740 0.4741
China 0.1727 0.1742 0.4829 0.4830
Brazil 0.0757 0.0765 0.4861 0.4862
Canada 0.2842 0.2861 0.4851 0.4852
Spain 0.2016 0.2032 0.4860 0.4861
Mexico 0.2510 0.2527 0.4901 0.4901
Russia 0.1511 0.1524 0.4903 0.4904
Netherland 0.4478 0.4486 0.4915 0.4916
Australia 0.1686 0.1700 0.4909 0.4909
India 0.0966 0.0975 0.4913 0.4913
Switzerland 0.0739 0.2024 0.4935 0.4935
Belgium and Luxembourg 0.4237 0.4247 0.4936 0.4936
Argentina 0.0889 0.0889 0.4937 0.4937
Sweden 0.2397 0.2414 0.4934 0.4934
Turkey 0.1492 0.1505 0.4936 0.4937
Austria 0.3039 0.3056 0.4944 0.4945
Denmark 0.2485 0.2502 0.4955 0.4955
Norway 0.2182 0.2199 0.4960 0.4960
Greece 0.1921 0.1936 0.4960 0.4961
South Africa 0.1926 0.1941 0.4961 0.4962
Finland 0.2298 0.2314 0.4965 0.4965
Portugal 0.3124 0.3141 0.4969 0.4969
Israel 0.2998 0.3015 0.4974 0.4974
Ireland 0.4552 0.4559 0.4981 0.4981
New Zealand 0.2335 0.2352 0.4983 0.4983
Hungary 0.4273 0.4283 0.4987 0.4967
Table C.7: Sensitivity Tests for the Share of Diusive Technology
D 0.7 0.9 0.99
k 0.5518 0.5517 0.5419
b 0.3196 0.3078 0.2882
Table C.8: Robustness Check for Change of Welfare Gains (%) if All Technologies are Diusive
(D = 1)
(consumption equivalence)
(log(con1=con0))  100
Average 31 countries Maximum among 31 countries
free trade and free diusion 61.17 160.56
(k = 1; b = 1)
only free trade in goods 20.41 27.42
(k = 1)
only free technology diusion 34.84 82.12
(b = 1)
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Table C.9: Robustness Check for Change of Welfare Gains (%) Using Larger Diusion Share Data
by Royalty-calculated Method
(consumption equivalence)
(log(con1=con0))  100
Average 31 countries Maximum among 31 countries
free trade and free diusion 60.93 116.39
(k = 1; b = 1)
only free trade in goods 24.94 37.91
(k = 1)
only free technology diusion 35.33 60.87
(b = 1)
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